Normative Balance and Electoral Reform
A Finnish Puzzle and a Comparative Analysis

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Abstract: The Finnish electoral system has recently been changed to slightly increase proportionality, but nothing has been done to make cabinet alternatives more “identifiable” before the election. This outcome poses a major puzzle for one important theoretical approach to electoral change. This approach sees normatively “unbalanced” systems as vulnerable to reform and would have expected a significant increase in the pre-electoral identifiability of competing cabinet options. The article explains the Finnish case by embedding it in a comparative model of normative tradeoffs in democratic design. Based on Finnish case evidence and a statistical analysis of 100 elections in 32 democracies (from 2001 to 2011), the article argues that the type of democracy exemplified by Finland is not normatively unbalanced. In particular, the lack of pre-electoral identifiability is compensated for by an unconstrained multidimensionality of partisan preferences. While it may be true that normatively balanced designs are more stable, there is more than one way to be balanced.

Keywords: electoral reform, Finland, visions of democracy, proportional representation, identifiability

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1. Introduction

The electoral reforms of the 1990s in countries like New Zealand, Italy and Japan have inspired a large literature on institutional reform and stability. Renwick (2010) distinguishes two major theoretical approaches: one is focused on the self-interest of political elites (Colomer 2005); the other, developed mainly by Shugart (2001), sees an electoral system as “vulnerable to reform where it occupies an inherently extreme position on either an intra- or an inter-party dimension” (Renwick, 2010: 7). Our goal in this article is to contribute mainly to the second perspective. We do so by focusing on a case that is arguably among the most extreme and hence seemingly reform-prone cases on Shugart’s inter-party dimension. Finland scores high on proportionality; and voters find it virtually impossible to identify competing options for government prior to elections. This makes Finland a clear example of what Shugart calls a “hyper-representative” system. Based on his analysis, we might have expected Finland to establish institutional incentives for the formation of pre-electoral coalitions, thereby potentially increasing the identifiability of cabinet alternatives. Such incentives could have been created, for instance, by moving towards a mixed-member proportional system (Shugart, 2001) or by giving bonus seats to the largest party or bloc (Renwick et al., 2009). Yet Finnish elites have not shown any activity in this direction (Arter, 2006: 31). Instead, they have recently decided to further increase proportionality, starting from the 2015 parliamentary elections.

In solving this puzzle, our goal is not to provide an in-depth narrative of electoral reform in Finland. Instead, we follow Shugart’s (2001) approach and try to
understand this case by embedding it in a comparative model of normative tradeoffs in democratic designs. In doing so, we accept his main assumption, namely that normatively more “balanced” and less “extreme” institutional systems are more stable. However, we believe that this general idea needs to be spelled out differently. Indeed, Shugart (2001: 191) himself suggests that further conceptual development might be needed to “shed light on why hyper-representative systems like those in Belgium and Finland survive, and whether they may be candidates for future reform.” We try to make a modest contribution to this research agenda.

Our main argument is that Shugart’s verbal model of the relevant normative tradeoffs is too parsimonious. Drawing on the work of Powell (2000) and others, we propose an extended tradeoff model, according to which Finland is not normatively unbalanced or “extreme”. While the Finnish electoral system does sacrifice the goal of identifiability, something is gained in return: the unconstrained multidimensionality of partisan preferences. We argue that this is an important value in democratic politics, and that there is a widely neglected tradeoff between identifiability and multidimensionality. More precisely, the ability of electoral systems to reconcile proportionality with identifiability is likely to be dependent on a low dimensionality of partisan conflict. We analyze the relationship between proportionality, identifiability and dimensionality with data on 100 elections in 32 democracies for the period from 2001 to 2011.

Section 2 elaborates on Shugart’s (2001) analysis and the Finnish puzzle. Section 3 summarizes institutional change and stability in Finland and rejects two potential explanations of the puzzle that would be consistent with Shugart’s model. Section 4 develops our extended normative tradeoff model. Section 5 explores the tradeoff
between identifiability and dimensionality, which is crucial to our interpretation of the Finnish case. Section 6 summarizes the main results and makes suggestions for further research.

2. Normative balance and the Finnish puzzle

Shugart’s (2001) starting point is the introduction of “mixed-member” electoral systems (MMS) in four countries: Italy, Japan, New Zealand and Venezuela. One of his main ideas is that these electoral systems achieve some “balance” between competing normative goals and, indeed, competing “visions” of democracy (Powell 2000). In developing this point, he focuses on two central goals: identifiability for the “majoritarian” vision and proportionality for the “proportional” vision. Shugart argues that these goals can be simultaneously achieved when electoral systems are proportional but also provide parties with incentives to form two pre-electoral coalitions; voters can thus choose a party as a representative agent and at the same time directly empower a government:

Theoretically we can expect the tier of single-seat districts to encourage parties to aggregate into two principal blocs — generating high identifiability — and the proportional tier to moderate or eliminate (depending on specific details of how the tiers are combined) the disproportionality of the outcome. The resulting governments can be expected to be efficient in the sense that they are both empowered from the election outcome yet constrained by the need for coalitions to take in a broader swath of the electorate’s preferences. (Shugart, 2001: 175)

He calls systems that achieve identifiability and proportionality “balanced” or “efficient”. While he focuses on mixed electoral systems, other forms of identifiability-inducing electoral systems could easily be integrated into the analysis.
An obvious example is Italy’s bonus-adjusted PR system introduced in 2005 (Renwick et al., 2009).

Shugart’s analysis has both normative and explanatory elements. On the one hand, he provides a normative analysis of tradeoffs and optimization. It is comparable to the study by Carey and Hix (2011), which also argues that some class of electoral systems is optimal, given some set of goals. This sort of normative analysis does not necessarily have implications for institutional change. After all, history is not necessarily efficient. One the other hand, Shugart does suggest “that there may be a political convergence underway, as a specific class of electoral system is being selected to cope with the perceived failures of very different pre-existing electoral systems” (Shugart, 2001: 173-4 , emphasis added). The idea is that that there may be a long-term trend towards greater normative balance. Accordingly, he suggests that the stability of seemingly unbalanced cases like Finland require a special explanation and proposes to “assess in more detail the contribution of efficiency failures to electoral reform” (Shugart 2001, 191). To our knowledge, this challenge has not been taken up, at least not for Finland.

Finland is important in that it is the most unbalanced case in Shugart’s (2001) analysis (along the “inter-party dimension”). He builds an index of electoral efficiency, in which zero stands for perfect efficiency. Cases can depart from this benchmark in two directions. Departures toward “pluralitarian” democracy are measured by a kind of disproportionality index. Departures toward “hyper-representative” democracy are measured by the average of two variables: a measure of pre-electoral identifiability (Strøm, 1990, Huber and Powell, 1994, Powell, 2000) and a measure of how closely the election outcome approximates a legislative
majority for the winning party or bloc. The combination of the two variables is called *electoral linkage*. Based on his empirical analysis of established democracies, he identifies Finland as the most “hyper-representative case”, followed by Belgium and Italy.

Given that Shugart’s analysis is somewhat dated by now, we provide an update. Instead of re-building Shugart’s index of inter-party efficiency, however, we propose a new measure of identifiability and visualize its correlation with proportionality. Our indicator also combines two measures. First, we measure how well parties coordinate into two blocs before the election. We do this by adding up the vote share of the two largest identifiable blocs, where a bloc is either a party or a pre-electoral coalition (*blocseats*). This measure captures parties’ strategic decisions about party entry, party mergers and pre-electoral coalition-formation as well as voters’ strategic reactions to the available options. In case of a pure two-party or two-bloc system, the value of this variable would be 1 and it would be guaranteed that one bloc has a legislative majority. Second, we use a dummy variable to measure whether the cabinets actually formed after the election consisted only of a single pre-electoral bloc (*blocgov*). This measure is more sensitive to cases in which there is a fair degree of two-bloc competition before the election, but neither bloc wins a majority. To measure identifiability associated with each cabinet formation, we calculate the average of *blocseats* and the *blocgov*. The correlation between our indicator of identifiability and Shugart’s (2001) combined measure of “electoral linkage” is .84.¹

₁ FIGURE 1 HERE
Figure 1 shows the scatterplot of (dis-)proportionality (Gallagher 1991) and identifiability for 32 democracies between (averages for the period from 2001 and 2011). We see that there is a strong trade-off between these two goals (cf. Powell, 2000), but it may not be linear (cf. Carey and Hix, 2011). Some countries are able to combine fairly high levels of proportionality with high identifiability. We also see that there are quite a few cases in which identifiability is sacrificed in favor of high proportionality. Finland is thus hardly unique, but it is still a prime example of a “hyper-representative” democracy in Shugart’s framework. The quantitative measurement for Finland is also confirmed by qualitative studies: “In order not to exclude themselves from cabinet formation negotiations, parties do not present voters with pre-election alliances, nor do they make public statements ruling out power sharing with particular parties.” (Raunio, 2011: 126)

3. How not to explain electoral change in Finland

Despite the complete absence of identifiability, there have been no efforts to increase it. If anything, the Finnish electoral system has become more extreme from Shugart’s (2001) perspective. In this section, we first summarize the basics of the electoral system as well as its recent reform. We then sketch two potential explanations for the lack of identifiability-enhancement that would be consistent with Shugart’s analysis. We reject both of them as being inconsistent with the facts.

The Finnish constitution requires a direct, proportional and secret vote, for which the country is to be divided into no less than twelve and no more than 18 electoral districts (Raunio, 2005: 475). Apart from these requirements (as well as the voting age), the electoral law can be changed by a simple majority vote in parliament. Since
1962 Finland has been divided into 14 multimember districts – with magnitudes between 6 and 35 – and one single-member district. The mean district magnitude approximates 14. Due to the varying district magnitudes, the implicit electoral threshold varies from around 3 to 14 percent. There are no nationwide adjustment seats and there is no legal threshold (Raunio, 2005: 477). Seats are distributed at the district level using the d’Hondt method, which favors larger parties. Disproportionality has nevertheless been fairly low due to the averaging out of higher disproportionalsities at the district level (see Figure 1). Finland operates an open-list PR system that is strongly candidate-centered (Raunio, 2011: 118-19). Given the mechanisms of a parliamentary (premier-presidential) system, though, party discipline is nevertheless high and political accountability is still to a large extent party-based (Wiberg, 2000, Pajala, 2010).

Until the mid-2000s there had been “little or no debate in Finland about electoral reform for general elections.” (Arter, 2006: 31) Shortly afterwards, however, a debate on proportionality emerged, initiated by the smaller parties. They had repeatedly proposed to change the sizes of the constituencies, or to introduce nationwide adjustment seats, or to replace the d’Hondt method with the Sainte-Laguë formula; but these proposals were rejected by the three largest parties (Raunio, 2005: 487). The debate intensified in 2007, after the Chairwoman of the Green League had failed to get elected despite winning almost 12 percent of the vote in her electoral district of North Karelia. A commission was installed which proposed the introduction of a system that would have allowed parties to enter parliament either by winning 3.5 percent of the nationwide votes or 12 percent in a district; electoral alliances at the district level would have been banned (Helsingin
Sanomat, 2008). The proposal was criticized by experts for making it more difficult for smaller parties to enter parliament. There was also disagreement between the political parties: the Swedish People’s Party (due to its localized electoral support base) and the Social Democrats preferred a rearrangement of electoral districts, whereas the True Finns preferred a lower threshold of two percent. In May 2009 the government – consisting of Centre Party, Conservatives (KOK), Greens and the Swedish Minority – agreed on a nationwide threshold of 3 per cent but rejected a second path into parliament by clearing a higher threshold at the district level. Since the reform implied a constitutional change, it had to be approved by a two thirds majority in the next Parliament. In the new parliament, elected in 2011, however, the reform failed due to opposition from the Social Democrats (Helsingin Sanomat, 2011).

In 2012 though, the new government – including Social Democrats, Conservatives, Greens, Left Alliance, Christians and the Swedish minority – could agree on a more moderate reform: the number of districts was reduced from 14 to 12 by merging the districts of Kymi and South Savo and those of North Savo and Northern Karelia. The new districts are expected to send 17 MPs and 15 MPs, respectively, to Parliament in the 2015 elections. The resulting increase in district magnitude is likely to increase proportionality. The Greens are expected to profit from the new system whereas the Social Democrats are expected to lose seats (Helsingin Sanomat, 2012).

The most parsimonious and highly convincing explanation of the Finnish reform would be one focused entirely on partisan self-interest (Colomer 2005). Once a multi-party system is established, finding majority support for decreases of
proportionality may be difficult (but see Renwick, 2010). To the contrary, small parties can use their bargaining power in coalition-building to reduce biases against them, as they did in Finland. Finland fits Colomer’s “prediction” of a long-run trend towards more proportionality. If our goal were merely to find the most parsimonious explanation for why proportionality increased in Finland, we could stop here.

Our explanandum is different, though. We do not ask why Finland increased proportionality rather than maintaining the status quo, but why Finland did (only) increase proportionality, rather than (also) increasing identifiability. For this question, Colomer’s self-interest model is of little help, since it ignores identifiability. Since our explanandum is derived from Shugart’s discussion, we first have to ask whether there are potential explanations of the non-increase of identifiability in Finland that are consistent with his parsimonious tradeoff model. We see two such explanations.

The first explanation would be that other, non-electoral, pre-conditions for two-bloc competition were lacking in Finland. In particular, such competition might be predicated on the absence of strong legislative veto points for the opposition. As Powell (2000) emphasizes, it seems incoherent to elect an identifiable majority government and then force it to compromise with the oppositional minority. This potential explanation does not work, though, as Finland moved from a supermajoritarian to a majoritarian system of legislative decision-making in the early 1990s. Until the late 1980s, a one-third minority in parliament could postpone legislation until after the next parliamentary election. This minority veto, commonly cited a reason for the Finnish tradition of forming oversized cabinets, was abolished completely by 1992 (Mattila, 1997, Raunio and Wiberg, 2008). In addition, the
The legislative veto of the Finnish president was first weakened and finally abolished. The revised Finnish constitution, in force since March 2000, allows a parliamentary majority to override a presidential veto immediately. In sum, there would have been no institutional obstacles for installing a system of two-bloc competition and majority cabinets.

The other potential explanation could be that two-bloc competition was not necessary due to the directly elected president. This is explanation is hinted at by Shugart (2001: 191, n. 8) himself: “the presence of the elected presidency — recently transformed from selection via an electoral college to direct election — may mitigate the inefficiency of the parliamentary electoral process.” Identifiability may be realized in presidential rather than parliamentary elections. Yet this explanation fails for a similar reason as the first one: due to a series of constitutional reforms the Finnish President has been transformed into a mere figurehead, direct elections notwithstanding.

Between 1919 and 1987 the president was indirectly elected by an electoral college. The indirect electoral system was a consequence of the political left’s opposition to a directly elected president. The president was very powerful, both formally and informally. Among his formal powers was the right to unilaterally dissolve the legislature. In practice the president also enjoyed discretion in government formation (Jyränki, 2007: 289f), which implied that, after the Second World War, governments used to resign after each presidential election. In 1969 a center-left government installed a constitutional reform committee, which was to prepare a comprehensive institutional reform. The first attempt failed, due to the resistance of the political right and the incumbent president Kekkonen (Jyränki,
However, in the late 1980s and early 1990s parliament adopted several constitutional amendments which strengthened the president’s electoral connection but also greatly reduced his or her formal powers. The direct election of the president was introduced in a preliminary version in 1987 and finally in 1991. The president’s competence to dissolve the legislature was abolished – it can now only be exercised upon the request of the prime minister – and the president’s power in cabinet formation was considerably weakened. The new constitution of March 2000 strengthened the role of parliament further. The president’s role in government formation is now purely formal and the legislative veto can be immediately overridden by parliament, as noted above. The president’s powers to influence governmental policy decisions have been largely eliminated and his or her appointment powers have been strongly reduced (Paloheimo, 2003: 225, Jyränki, 2007: 298f).

In sum, the idea that the directly elected president mitigates the “inefficiency” of parliamentary elections is implausible. To the contrary, the reforms of the presidency established “a more direct link between election results and cabinet formation” (Raunio, 2011: 126) and thus made the lack of identifiability potentially more visible and salient. From the perspective of Shugart’s tradeoff model, the Finnish case has become more puzzling. To explain it, we suggest an extension of the model.

4. Why the Finnish case is not unbalanced

In order to re-specify the idea of “normative balance”, we draw on ideas of Powell (2000) – as did Shugart – as well as on more recent work by Ward and
Weale (2010). Powell (2000) distinguishes two “visions” of democracy and associates each vision with a number of normative goals. Shugart (2001) selects merely one goal of each vision – identifiability and proportionality – and argues that systems which can achieve both are balanced. We believe that (1) more goals have to be taken into account and that (2) an adequate model of the relevant normative tradeoffs depends on how we conceptualize the two polar “visions” of democracy.

Like Powell and Shugart, we model one polar vision of democracy on the “Westminster” system: two parties compete in a one-dimensional issue space; one of them gains a majority and dominates the legislative process. We call this vision of democracy simple majoritarianism (Ganghof, 2014). Shugart (2001) does not say much about the polar alternative to the Westminster model, except that is based on proportional representation (PR). In specifying this alternative, we draw on an idea that Powell mentioned but did not develop. The idea was that “policymakers should choose the policy desired by the citizen majority on each issue. Because many issues will be considered by the national government between every election and different sets of citizens will form the majority on different issues, it is important that the policy-making coalition not be locked into place by the immediate election outcome” (Powell 2000: 256, n. 9). This “vision” of democracy was more recently elaborated by Ward and Weale (2010) in social choice terms (although without reliance on Powell’s work). The underlying ideal is to let the median voter win on each separable dimension of a multidimensional issue-space. Since preference constellations can differ across dimensions, different parties may represent the median voter on different dimensions, so that different majorities are formed. Ward
and Weale therefore speak of an ideal of “majorities rule”. Here we refer to this ideal as *complex majoritarianism* (Ganghof, 2014).

We contend that if we use the conceptual contrast between simple and complex majoritarianism, we gain a more adequate perspective on the most salient tradeoffs in the design of democracy and are able to see that Finnish democracy is not unbalanced but arguably well balanced. To develop this argument, we proceed in two steps. First we specify three crucial goals associated with each polar vision of majoritarianism (Table 1). Then we argue that there are *two* intermediate models between the two polar extremes. Shugart (2001) focuses on one of these models, while Finland is a fairly good example of the other.

Note that the following discussion focuses on pure parliamentary systems with a single chain of delegation from voters to policymakers. While Finland is technically a semi-presidential system, we have shown above that the Finnish president has become formally so weak that it can be analyzed as a parliamentary system.4

**TABLE 1 HERE**

Simple majoritarianism in parliamentary systems is associated with three main goals. The first is *identifiability*. The second goal is *clarity of responsibility* (Powell, 2000). It is perhaps greatest with one-party majority cabinets but can also be fairly high under coalition cabinets, even those that lack pre-electoral identifiability. More precisely, when parties form a majority coalition of parties that recognize each other as “veto players” on all issue dimensions (Tsebelis, 2002), they become *jointly responsible* for all legislative outcomes during the legislative term.5 In contrast, clarity of responsibility is lower under minority cabinets with shifting majority coalitions, or when majority cabinets have to negotiate with additional veto players.
not included in the cabinet. Finally, *cabinet stability* is of general practical importance in a parliamentary democracy, but it is also a sort of auxiliary means for identifiability and clarity of responsibility. If an identifiable majority coalition is voted into office but soon replaced by some other coalition without new elections, the potential gain of identifiability is likely to be lost. Similarly, even if new cabinets are empowered by new elections, frequently changing cabinets make it more difficult for voters to see who is responsible for policy outputs and outcomes (cf. Powell, 2000: 61). In sum, the ideal of simple majoritarianism implies high identifiability, clarity of responsibility and cabinet stability (Table 1).^6^

Now consider the three core goals associated with complex majoritarianism. The first is electoral *proportionality*. The second is what we call *unconstrained multidimensionality* of parties’ programmatic positions. By this we mean that parties face no institutional incentives to “integrate” certain salient issues into some dominant dimension such as an economic left-right dimension. A multidimensional differentiation of preferences can mean, for instance, that the European Union (or certain aspects of it) becomes a cross-cutting issue. Voters on the left and the right can then decide whether they want to support more or less Euro-skeptical parties. Democratic theorists have given different reasons for why this multidimensional differentiation of preferences is desirable. Some highlight the cognitive constraints of normal citizens and the importance of multidimensional party programs in educating them about how issues do or don’t relate to one another; for others the multidimensional differentiation of partisan positions is a precondition for achieving congruence between the issue-specific medians among the voters and in parliament (Ward and Weale 2010; Ganghof Forthcoming).
Finally, the polar ideal-type of complex majoritarianism also requires that the issue-specific medians in parliament be empowered. In other words, legislative decision-making should be as issue-specific as possible. We call this goal \textit{unconstrained issue-specificity}. In sum, the ideal of complex majoritarianism implies maximal proportionality as well as unconstrained multidimensionality and issue-specific decision-making (Table 1).

Based on the six goals just specified, we can distinguish four ideal-typical visions of democracy in parliamentary systems, the two polar ones sketched above as well as two compromise visions that mix elements of simplicity and complexity. To develop the four visions, we draw on another crucial idea of Powell (2000). He focuses strongly on the how the “decisive stage” of decision-making differed in the visions of democracy. His main distinction is between the pre-electoral stage (central in the majoritarian vision) and the post-electoral stage (crucial to the proportional vision). We sub-divide these two stages further and distinguish four ideal-types of majority formation based on the \textit{stage of the democratic process at which majorities are formed}. Democracies can form majorities at four consecutive stages (Figure 2):

\textbf{FIGURE 2 HERE}

The two polar stages of majority formation correspond to the two polar visions of simple and complex majoritarianism sketched above. They tend to achieve the goals inherent to the underlying model of majoritarianism at the expense of the goals associated with the competing vision. In the “Westminster” model of democracy, the most decisive stage of majority formation is the first, party formation, stage. Ideally, only two parties form, one of which gains a majority and dominates the legislative
process. To the extent that such a two-party-equilibrium can be sustained at all, though, it usually requires a highly disproportional electoral system and a one-dimensional structure of political conflict. New Zealand before the electoral reform and Great Britain before the current coalition government are well-known examples (cf. Nagel, 1998, Powell, 2000, Lijphart, 2012). Conversely, the ideal of complex majoritarianism can be best approximated when majority formation is postponed until the last and final stage of law-making. In parliamentary systems, this happens when a highly proportional electoral system facilitates a multidimensional structure of preferences, and when legislative and executive institutions facilitate the emergence and stability of minority cabinets with changing support parties. The Danish case is perhaps the best real-world example, especially in the 1980s (Damgaard and Svensson, 1989).

Our tradeoff model identifies two balanced visions of democracy, associated with the two intermediate stages of majority formation in Figure 1. When the decisive stage of majority formation is the formation of pre-electoral alliances, we have the vision of democracy highlighted by Shugart (see also Golder, 2006: 2-4, 137-138). It promises to combine the three goals of simple majoritarianism with one core goal of complex majoritarianism: proportionality. This combination is attractive because it allows voters to simultaneously choose a party and a cabinet. It may lead to superior democratic performance, e.g. with respect to turnout (Tillman, 2013).

Yet what authors like Shugart and Tillman neglect, is that the “Alliance” vision of majority formation comes with normative costs of its own. Combining high proportionality with the competition of two comprehensive blocs is likely to be predicated on a low-dimensional structure of partisan preferences. Indeed, it is
plausible to assume that when certain electoral systems (e.g. mixed-member proportional or PR with majority bonus) provide strong incentives for the formation of pre-electoral coalitions, they do so at least partly by reducing dimensionality. The constraining effect on dimensionality may be one of the causal mechanisms that make the kind of normative balancing envisioned by Shugart possible. As Christiansen and Damgaard (2008: 69) note for Scandinavia, for example: “Pre-electoral coalitions limit individual parties from pursuing an electoral strategy with a clear policy profile, which may disengage the party faithful and also could cost voters for individual parties in the coalition.” As we have argued, the clear multidimensional differentiation of policy profile is a distinct democratic value in its own right and an essential part of the vision of complex majoritarianism.

We can now see that majority formation at the third, cabinet formation, stage is also a balanced vision of parliamentary democracy (Figure 2). Parties eschew the formation of pre-electoral pacts (and anti-pacts), but build majority coalitions – either majority cabinets or minority cabinets with stable support arrangements – directly after the election. This “Cabinet” vision of majority formation can combine two goals of each polar vision of majoritarianism. Since parties form stable majority coalitions of veto players, they can achieve a high degree of joint responsibility for policy outcomes and high cabinet stability. And since the proportionally elected parties eschew pre-electoral pacts, they are free to differentiate their policy position in a clear and multidimensional manner.

FIGURE 3 HERE

Now, our argument is that the real-world case of Finland embodies many of the elements of the “Cabinet” vision. Cabinet stability has been fairly high since the
early 1980s (Raunio and Wiberg, 2008: 588), and cabinets are majority coalitions that assume joint responsibility for the policies of the government. On the other hand, proportionality is also high (see section 2), and empirical studies show that Finland has one of the most multidimensional structures of party preferences in Western Europe. To illustrate the latter point, we rely on the Finnish expert survey in Benoit and Laver (2006), although we postpone a systematic comparative analysis until section 5. These authors estimated Finnish party positions on nine issues. A factor analysis shows that the preferences on these issues can be reduced to three main dimensions (Benoit and Laver, 2006: 178). Figure 3 illustrates these dimensions by displaying the weighted average of party positions on the most relevant constituent dimensions, with the weights being derived from the factor analysis. The first dimension summarizes parties’ positions on questions of “social liberalism” (e.g. same-sex marriage), immigration and “EU authority”, which have played an important role in the most recent Finnish election (Nurmi and Nurmi, 2012: 235). The second dimension concerns economic left-right issues such as taxation and deregulation. The third dimension, which was also considered highly important by the experts, captures aspects of decentralization and “EU accountability”. Figure 3 reveals the extent to which parties’ positions are multidimensional, i.e. not correlated across the dimensions. For example, the True Finns (PS) are very moderate on economic policy issues but most rightist on the other two dimensions, which contributed to their vote and seat gains in the 2011 election (Arter, 2012, Nurmi and Nurmi, 2012, Raunio, 2012). On the left side of the spectrum, we see that each of the three left parties has the most leftist profile on one of the three dimensions, while being more moderate on others. This
multidimensionality of preferences educates voters about their choices as well as
giving them more freedom in expressing them. Note also that our quantitative
description of Finland as multidimensional is corroborated by studies applying other
methods (e.g. Bakker et al., 2010, Singh, 2012).

We do not claim, of course, that all important features of Finnish politics are
captured by our “Cabinet” vision of majority formation. Most notably, there is still a
strong tendency to build oversized coalitions, which is not a necessary element of
this vision. What matters is that the legislative majority coalition (whether it is
oversized or minimal winning) is not identifiable before the election, but commits to
governing together on all issues after it. Oversized coalitions are not in conflict with
this vision, but they do complicate things. It may be possible for individual parties to
leave the cabinet without requiring a new cabinet formation or election. In March
2014, for instance, the Left Alliance left the oversized cabinet (the one that had
passed the electoral reform) over a conflict about the budget. This will be counted as
“cabinet instability” on some measures, but it also shows that parties do indeed have
to take joint responsibility for the entire policy package of the cabinet as long as
they are part of it. Since the Left Alliance could not accept the negotiated package of
spending cuts and tax rises, it decided to leave. In contrast to the “Law” vision of
majority formation, it is not possible for a party to pick and choose.

TABLE 2 HERE

Table 2 summarizes our reasoning about tradeoffs in a condensed and stylized
manner. We see no basis for arguing that the “Alliance” vision of majority formation
is more balanced than the “Cabinet” vision. If anything, the latter is more balanced,
as it combines two goals of each polar extreme. We must remember, though, that
we, like Shugart (2001), have merely proposed a verbal model of the relevant normative tradeoffs. Such a model cannot be true or false, since it has to rely on simplifying assumptions and neglect a great deal of reality. The important questions are whether a model is consistent and whether it is useful for answering specific research question (cf. Clarke and Primo, 2012). Our model is consistent in that it covers all main stages of majority formation and useful in that it aids our understanding of the Finnish case. It is a mistake, in our view, to believe that a system that sacrifices the goal of identifiability is automatically unbalanced and subject to reform pressures.

We have merely provided a theoretical interpretation of the Finnish case, though. We present no direct evidence that political actors view the normative tradeoffs as postulated in our model and that this view has guided their actions. Providing this direct evidence was not our ambition. Our goal was rather to use the alleged Finnish puzzle to gain general insights about the tradeoffs in democratic design and develop new hypotheses for more systematic comparative analysis. In line with this goal, the next section will put the Finnish case in comparative perspective.

5. The tradeoff between identifiability and dimensionality

Our verbal model of the normative tradeoffs in democratic design implies that there is a strong tradeoff between the goals of identifiability and unconstrained multidimensionality. Indeed, highlighting this potential tradeoff is one major insight provided by our theoretical discussion. Arguments about the optimality of an “Alliance” vision of majority formation like Shugart (2001) and Tillman (2013) neglect this potential tradeoff. In this section we want to provide some initial empirical evidence for its existence.
We measure identifiability as explained in section 2. To measure dimensionality, we again rely on the expert survey by Benoit and Laver (2006). We replicate this analysis and compute what we call the *effective number of dimensions*. That is, we simply add up the number of factors identified by the analysis but weight each factor with the size of its eigenvalue. Figure 4 shows the bivariate correlation between this measure of dimensionality and identifiability. It includes all democracies covered by Benoit and Laver’s factor analysis for which we could obtain data on identifiability (elections from 2001 to 2011).

**FIGURE 4 HERE**

Figure 4 visualizes the simple correlation between identifiability and multidimensionality. It suggests that there is a strong tradeoff between these two goals and that Finland does indeed gain something by sacrificing identifiability. But bivariate correlations can be deceptive. Maybe the relationship between dimensionality and identifiability reflects solely the disproportionality of an electoral system and the effective number of parties – rather than separate electoral incentives to build pre-electoral coalitions between these parties. A comparison of Figures 1 and 4 already suggests that this is unlikely: the correlation is much stronger for dimensionality than for proportionality. Table 3 shows the results of a more direct test. We regress identifiability on disproportionality (Gallagher, 1991), the effective number of parliamentary parties (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979) and the effective number of dimensions. The results show that all three variables are correlated with identifiability (models 1-3) and that the effective number of parties explains most of the variance in identifiability (model 2). What is crucial here is that the estimated “effect” of disproportionality is not robust to the inclusion of the
effective number of parties, whereas dimensionality is (models 4 and 5). Hence, while this is a simple and preliminary analysis, it supports the idea that there is a tradeoff between identifiability and dimensionality that is not fully mediated by the effective number of parties. As we suggested, if multiple parties succeed in forming two comprehensive blocs that compete for cabinet power, a likely side-effect is a reduction of dimensionality.

One last point has to be considered. The results in Table 3 tell us nothing about the direction of causality. Our theoretical discussion has so far focused on the causal direction going from electoral institutions to dimensionality – and this is the assumption in the regression analysis. Yet we have to be attentive to the possibility that electoral institutions are also to some extent endogenous to the features of the party system. Colomer (2005) and others have made this argument with respect to the effective number of parties. The idea is that multiple parties may emerge regardless of the pre-existing electoral system but may subsequently facilitate the emergence, stability or extent of proportional representation. We believe that a similar argument might be developed for the dimensionality of party systems. That is, multidimensionality may develop to some extent independently from the electoral system – based on social and economic divides – but may subsequently influence the selection of electoral institutions that stabilize the pre-existing dimensionality of preferences. A country with a history of bipolarity may thus be more likely to adopt incentives for pre-electoral coalition formation than a country with a historical absence of such bipolarity, such as Finland.

This possibility poses no problems for our main argument. Indeed, we find it highly plausible that causality goes in both directions: from electoral institutions to
dimensionality and the other way around. Neither we nor Shugart have claimed that “normative balance” is the only consideration in electoral reforms. As argued by Colomer (2005), partisan self-interest is certainly of major importance; and we find it plausible that partisan self-interest is influenced by pre-existing dimensionality. In a multidimensional system like that of Finland, each party might ask itself how a change towards a more one-dimensional, bipolar competition would affect its own interests. A party may be highly uncertain about the consequences of increased bipolarity, or it may fear adverse effects. For example, a party might gain bargaining power by having a pivotal (median) position on one of several dimensions. Another party (like the True Finns) may have an extreme position on some dimension that contributes to its electoral success. Both types of parties would have little reason to support an electoral reform that reduces dimensionality. If this sort of self-interest explanation does capture parts of the Finnish case (which is something we don’t know and certainly haven’t shown), it would complement our “normative balancing” explanation. Our main point is that, regardless of which explanatory approach one favors or whether one combines them, the Finnish case is not puzzling. Neither partisan self-interest nor normative inefficiency provided a strong stimulus for a major reform of the Finnish electoral system.

6. Conclusion

This article has taken up Shugart’s idea that normatively “balanced” designs of democracy may be less vulnerable to reform. We believe that this idea deserves further development and testing. As a modest contribution to its conceptual development, we have proposed a more complex tradeoff model and argued that the
The seemingly puzzling case of Finland is not normatively unbalanced. Finnish democracy does balance elements of simple and complex majoritarianism. Whilst the goal of identifiability is indeed sacrificed, something is gained in return: the unconstrained multidimensionality of partisan preferences. This, we have argued, is a central component of the ideal of complex majoritarianism and difficult to combine with high identifiability.

We see three main directions for future research. The first is to gather more in-depth case study evidence about the role that normative considerations have played in Finland and elsewhere. The second is to provide a fuller quantitative analysis of the normative tradeoffs assumed in our model of the four visions of majority formation. The third is to test the hypotheses about institutional stability and change that follow from our expanded tradeoff model. This model implies that a PR-based parliamentary system of minority cabinets and shifting majority coalitions in the legislature is relatively unbalanced and may thus be subject to reform pressures. The recent tendencies of Scandinavian parties to build pre-electoral alliances and more stable majority arrangements – which happened partly in response to changes in budgetary rules (Christiansen and Damgaard, 2008: 64-67) – suggest that this hypothesis deserves systematic testing.
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Figure 1: Identifiability and (Dis-)Proportionality

Note: The reported values are averages. For the data used, see note 2.
Figure 2: Four stages of majority formation

Party Formation \(\rightarrow\) Alliance Formation \(\rightarrow\) Cabinet Formation \(\rightarrow\) Law Formation
Figure 3: Multidimensionality in Finland

- **Factor 1 (EV=4.1)** ~ Social Policy / Immigration / EU: Accountability
  - KD
  - KESK
  - KOK
  - PS
  - SDP
  - SFP
  - VAS
  - VIHR

- **Factor 2 (EV=3.6)** ~ Tax vs Spending / Deregulation
  - VAS
  - VIHR
  - SDP
  - KOK
  - PS
  - SFP
  - KESK

- **Factor 3 (EV=1.0)** ~ Decentralization / EU: Authority
  - SDP
  - KOK
  - VAS
  - VIHR
  - KESK
  - K

Notes: EV refers to the Factor Eigenvalues of a principle components factor analysis (varimax-rotated loadings). We associate issues with a factor when they are fairly highly correlated with that factor (correlation coefficient of 0.5 or higher) and not similarly highly correlated with another factor. The average party positions are weighted by these coefficients. Party abbreviations: KD-Christian Democrats | KESK–Centre Party | KOK–Conservatives | PS–True Finns | SDP–Social Democrats | SFP–Swedish People’s Party | VAS–Left Alliance | VIHR–Green League.

Source: Own analysis based on Benoit and Laver (2006).
Figure 4: Identifiability and Dimensionality

Note: The reported values are averages. For the data used, see note 2.
Table 1: Goals of Simple and Complex Majoritarianism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Simple Majoritarianism</th>
<th>Complex Majoritarianism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identifiability</td>
<td>Proportionality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clarity of Responsibility</td>
<td>Unconstrained Multidimensionality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet Stability</td>
<td>Unconstrained Issue-Specificity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 1: Normative Tradeoffs and Visions of Democracy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Visions of</th>
<th>Simple</th>
<th>⇐</th>
<th>⇒</th>
<th>Complex</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
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<td>Party</td>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>Cabinet</td>
<td>Law</td>
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<tr>
<td>Majoritarianism</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identifiability</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clear Responsibility</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabinet Stability</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportionality</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multidimensionality</td>
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<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Issue-Specificity</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Empirical examples**

| Britain | Germany | Finland | Denmark |

*Source: Own composition*

*Notes:* + (-) means that the specified goal has a high (low) chance of being achieved in the respective model of majority formation.
Table 3: OLS-Regressions, Dependent Variable is Identifiability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>M1</th>
<th>M2</th>
<th>M3</th>
<th>M4</th>
<th>M5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>-0.184***</td>
<td>-0.182***</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-6.60)</td>
<td>(-2.88)</td>
<td>(-2.81)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ENPP</td>
<td>-0.147***</td>
<td>-0.105***</td>
<td>-0.102***</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(-7.47)</td>
<td>(-5.59)</td>
<td>(-5.63)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disproportionality</td>
<td>0.024***</td>
<td>0.003</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(3.16)</td>
<td>(0.44)</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.318***</td>
<td>1.131***</td>
<td>0.427***</td>
<td>1.350***</td>
<td>1.312***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(9.98)</td>
<td>(13.49)</td>
<td>(6.53)</td>
<td>(12.24)</td>
<td>(8.72)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$R^2$</td>
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<td>0.446</td>
<td>0.113</td>
<td>0.502</td>
<td>0.504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted $R^2$</td>
<td>0.357</td>
<td>0.441</td>
<td>0.104</td>
<td>0.492</td>
<td>0.488</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$t$ statistics in parentheses
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$
Note: For the data used, see note 2.
Endnotes

1 For the sake of comparability with Shugart (2001), we use averages over all cabinets from 1970 to 1999 (we weight those averages by cabinet duration). Shugart reports measures for 27 cases. We use 21 cases, excluding the presidential regimes and (due to data availability) Israel. Note that Shugart’s indicator focuses on elections, whereas blocgov may vary between elections. When this is the case, we calculated averages for the entire legislative period and weighted the cabinets with their respective duration.

2 Our selection of countries and the time period is driven by our usage of the expert survey of Benoit and Laver (2006); see below. Our data covers 100 elections in all parliamentary and semi-presidential systems that are included in Benoit and Laver (2006) and ParlGov (Döring and Manow, 2012).

3 Such systems do exist, however, most notably in Australia. For an analysis of their institutional logic, see Ganghof (2014, Forthcoming).

4 Elsewhere we analyze in more detail how the conceptual difference between simple and complex majoritarianism differs from Powell (2000) and how it relates to the contrast between parliamentary, presidential and mixed systems. See Ganghof (2014, Forthcoming).

5 Note that while we use Tsebelis’ term, we do not accept all of his claims. For a discussion of some problems and the application to Finland, see Ganghof (2006: 18-24, 103-109, 2011).

6 As Powell (2000: 60) emphasizes, it also implies highly disciplined parties. But since we focus on pure parliamentary systems here, we can simplify the analysis
by *assuming* party discipline. Note also that throughout the paper we avoid the use of the term “accountability”. A widespread view, often associated with Powell’s work, is that identifiability and clarity of responsibility translate into “accountability”. However, other authors argue that accountability may be highest when entry barriers for new parties are low, as is the case in a democracy with highly proportional and multidimensional party competition (McGann, 2013).

7 Benoit and Laver (2006: 156) estimate positions on the policy dimensions that country experts had considered “potentially important”. On average, there are nine dimensions per country.

8 Our “replication” differs from Benoit and Laver (2006) in that we average the expert scores for each party and issue before we perform the factor analysis.

9 See also note 8.

10 See also note 2.