



Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences



Wicked Problems, Contested Administrations:
Knowledge, Coordination, Strategy

The Research Colloquium of the Faculty of Economics and Social Sciences:
CURRENT RESEARCH ON “WICKED (POLICY) PROBLEMS”

“Great expectations of autonomous agencies”

Venue: University of Potsdam, Campus Griebnitzsee
House 7, Room 227

Date: 8 June 2016

Time: 12 – 14 c.t.

Sjors Overman
Utrecht University / The Netherlands



“Great Expectations of autonomous agencies”

The wide proliferation of semi-autonomous agencies has fundamentally altered the structure and face of the public sectors around the globe. And while the motives for the creation of semi-autonomous agencies gave rise to great expectations, the agencies have not lived up to them. My research shows that if we strive for good performance, solid accountability, and happy citizens and employees, then creating semi-autonomous agencies in the way that we have done until now, does not work. In this lecture I will, however, discuss ideas to improve the current performance of existing agencies in such a way that the agencies can, and will live up to their great expectations.



Sjors Overman is an assistant professor in public administration at the School of Governance, Utrecht University / The Netherlands. He works on issues relating to public sector reforms and their effects on accountability. His current work concentrates on the effects of accountability regimes on strategic decisions in cultural organizations, such as museums. In his PhD-project, he analyzed the effects of delegating public tasks to semi-autonomous agencies. These effects include partial implementation of accountability arrangements, less satisfied public personnel, and blame avoidance for politicians. He has published a number of articles in journals such as *Governance*, *Public Administration*, and *Public Management Review*.