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ILJA SERŽANT (Bergen)

The pragmatics and semantics of the bare partitive genitive in Ancient Greek*

Abstract

The present paper aims to investigate the main semantic-functional and discursive properties of partitives on the bases of the bare (independent) partitive genitive in Ancient Greek. Contrary to previous views that the bare partitive genitive (b-PG) primarily encodes the part-of-relation I claim that this meaning of the b-PG has been lost in Ancient Greek. Instead, I claim that the b-PG encodes undetermined instantiations of a set descriptive and restrictive in nature and compatible with kind- or subkind-referring NPs/DPs. It allows the speaker to make no commitment as to the quantity, referentiality and semantic role of these instantiation(s); this/these instantiation(s) have inherently narrow scope (e.g. with negation). These semantic properties determine the discursive function of the b-PG. I claim that the b-PG detracts the focus of attention from the actual participant and links it to the descriptive set or kind/subkind this participant belongs to; the actual participant is extremely backgrounded and its reference is never stored in the discourse model. The b-PG allows the speaker to zoom out from the actual participant and view it schematically in terms of one of its hypercategories (subkind, kind, characterizing/descriptive set). This function of the b-PG explains its frequent occurrence with the verbs of consumption or desire. It explains, furthermore, its use in the predicative position and in headings. As to the diachronic perspective, it is claimed that the foregroundedness of the respective hypercategory and extreme backgroundedness of the subset indicate that the b-PG develops semantically towards pseudo-partitivity.

Keywords: partitive, pseudo-partitive, quantification, definiteness, schematicity, construal

1. Introduction: the bare Partitive Genitive in Ancient Greek

The Indo-European languages typically lack a special partitive case, partitivity functions being expressed by means of other cases. The most prominent case that is employed in this function is the genitive (e.g. alongside the less common locative). I will refer to this particular use of the genitive in this paper as **partitive genitive** (henceforth: PG) according to the classical tradition (cf. ex 1) and to a PG that is not governed by any overt head as **the bare partitive genitive** (henceforth b-PG), cf. ex. (2):

- (1) *epecheírēsan kai Timoléonti dúo tôn dēmagōgôn*
 attack:3.PL and Timoleon two the:GEN.PL leader:GEN.PL
 ‘and two of the leaders (of Syracuse) have attacked Timoleon’

(Pl. Tim.37.1)

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- (2) ... *ho Kroisos, pempōn tōn*
 the:NOM Croisos:NOM send:PARTC.PRES.NOM.SG the:GEN.PL
Lydōn
 Lydians:GEN.PL
 ‘... Croisos, sending (some of the) Lydians’ (Hdt. Hist. 1.90.4)

In example (2) the constituent *tōn Lydōn* [lit.] ‘of Lydians’ is case-marked with a genitive case which is syntactically and semantically independent in the sense that there is no overt head that would license it (generally, the predicate *pempōn* ‘sending’ takes an accusative case-marked object).

The study is semasiologically conceived with the focus on the semantics and function of the b-PG in Ancient Greek. The b-PG is not a very frequent category in Ancient Greek, nevertheless it shows some degree of productivity. In several cases, it has been lexicalized (or generalized) and integrated into the case frame of particular verbs, such as *dei* ‘to be short of, lack, need’.

The b-PG has been submitted to scrutiny in several recent works (LURAGHI 2003; CONTI 2010; NAPOLI 2010). It is often assumed that the main function of a bare partitive case is to encode **partial affectedness** (cf., amongst others, CHANTRAINE 1953; KÜHNER & GERTH 1955 [1897]: 345; BLAKE 2001: 151; LURAGHI 2003: 60 ff.). However, as correctly pointed out, inter alia, by NAPOLI (2010: 23), this function does not account for all instances of the b-PG in Ancient Greek. Other functions of partitives have been mentioned in the literature. Thus, DAHL (2009) (on the empirical basis of Vedic Sanskrit) and NAPOLI (2010) (on Ancient Greek) assume that the b-PG is related to the aspectual category of clause boundedness following KIPARSKY’s (1998) analysis on the Finnish partitive case, while HOEKSEMA (1996), basing his evidence also on Finnish, suggests that partitives often mark indefiniteness. While such values as indefiniteness, unboundedness and partial affectedness are without a doubt attested with the b-PG, it seems, however, that they rather follow from the core function of the b-PG instead of instantiating it themselves. The main problem for these accounts is that these functions do not cover straightforwardly all instances of the b-PG in Ancient Greek, as will be shown below. The aim of the present study is, thus, to establish the core function of the b-PG. In the course of the paper I will make the following claims.

First, I will suggest that the b-PG does not encode indeterminacy as to the reference or quantity; it is its default, defeasible value. I will try to show that the b-PG does not encode a subset out of a superset; rather, it encodes undetermined-restrictives of a kind or of a set that provides a description or characterization for the instantiations and not a superset. Beside these semantic properties, I claim that the b-PG is discourse-driven. It serves to syntactically and discursively demote the actual participant and to promote the embedded kind/characterizing set; it allows the speaker to zoom out from the actual participant and to speak about it in terms of its hypercategory.

To corroborate these claims I will proceed as follows. In section 2 I will introduce the framework and the principles of the present semantic-functional analysis of the partitive genitive. In section 3 I will examine the semantic-functional properties of the underlying or embedded set of the b-PG, while section 4 will test such semantic-functional properties of the bare partitive genitive indefiniteness and indefinite quantification. Then, in section 5 I will present the discursive properties of the b-PG and determine its semantic properties as well as its core function. Finally, in section 6 I will summarize the main conclusions of the paper.

2. Framework

2.1. Subset vs. superset

I distinguish between the concepts of **subset** and **superset** (“domain” in LYONS 1999: 100, cf. “generator” in BARWISE & COOPER 1981) as they have different properties even though both rely on the same concept encoded by the embedded NP. Thus, in (2), the embedded DP *hoi Lydoi* ‘the Lydians’ is (definite) generic, has inherently wide scope being a proper name and is external to the event. The subset, in contrary, namely, exactly those Lydians that were sent by Croisos, i.e., the actual participant of the event, is indefinite and non-specific but event-internal. Additionally, the superset – being encoded by an overt expression – is inherently discursively more prominent than the subset which inherently lacks an overt expression by definition. The differences between the properties of the subset and those of the superset are obviously entailed by the function of the b-PG. The distinction between the superset and the subset helps to make the argumentation about the core function of the b-PG more transparent. To give an example: there are two stands on the status of the b-PG argument in (3):

- (3) As I told you, that is his form of madness. There you have a sample of his follies. ... he made himself very slender little ladders and so clambered up towards heaven; but he soon came hurtling down again and
- | | | |
|--------------------|------------|-----------------|
| <i>xunetribē</i> | <i>tēs</i> | <i>kephalēs</i> |
| crush:AOR.PASS.3SG | the:GEN.SG | head:GEN.SG |
- ‘he broke his head’ (Arist. Pax 71, translated by O’NEILL 1938, PPr)
Yesterday, to our misfortune, he went out and brought us back this thoroughbred

While BAUER (2007: 134) argues that the argument *tēs kefalēs* ‘of the head’ in (3) is indefinite, NAPOLI (2010: 26), in contrary, argues for its definiteness on the basis of the presence of a definite article (cf. similar argumentation in DAHL 2009: 39–40). There is some truth to both analysis, the problem being rather a lack of clear distinction between subset and superset. The b-PG expression in (3) is definite in its superset but indefinite in its subset. That is to say, the speaker intended to encode here that only particular part(s) of **the head** were affected, not the whole head (cf. KÜHNER & GERTH 1955 [1897]: 345). These parts are indefinite and cannot be deictically specified, whereas the superset “the head” in terms of all the parts of the head is not referred to by the b-PG in (3). This can be seen in the fact that the person whose head has been affected continues acting. Thus, the presence of the definite article in the genitive specifies the referent of the super- not of the subset. The well-known example from BRUGMANN & DELBRÜCK (1893: 585) illustrates the point:

- (4a) *pinō* *oinou*
 drink:1SG wine:GEN.SG
 ‘I drink wine.’
- (4b) *pinō* *tou* *oinou*
 drink:1SG the:GEN.SG wine:GEN.SG
 ‘I drink of this wine.’

In both sentences the subset is non-referential. The difference is rather in the scope of the superset from which the subset is extracted and not straightforwardly in the definiteness properties of the subset. The superset can be either general or kind-referring (as in 4a) or back-referring definite as in (4b) as will be elaborated below.

2.2. Defining partitivity

Intuitively, **partitivity** implies that something constitutes a part of a group, often referred to as **part-of-relation**, whereas the remainder of the group is not equal with the group: it lacks the subset:

- (5a) *We have very good students in our department* (superset)
 (5b) *some students speak Ancient Greek fluently* (subset)
 (5ca) *whereas the other students do not* (complement)
 (5cb) *so we can be very proud of our department*

In this example, the set *some students* is logically the **subset** or a part of the **superset** *our students* while *the other students* constitute the **complement** or the remainder of the superset (cf. HEUSINGER 2002, HEUSINGER & KORNFILT 2005; KORNFILT & HEUSINGER 2009), thus: **subset + complement = superset**. Semantically, partitives denote subsets of other sets in terms of their logical relations (HOEKSEMA 1996; DE HOOP 1997, 2003). This is an objective or logical sketch representation of the part-of-relation.

I assume, as commonly accepted (cf., inter alia, ENÇ 1991; HEUSINGER 2002: 261–262; KOPIJEVSKAJA-TAMM 2001), that the discourse (5a)+(5b)+(5ca) represents **true partitive relation** (“genuine partitive” in LYONS 1999: 100): the superset, the subset and the complement all have referents inside the discourse model and the distributional relation between them is clearly stated by the discourse.

2.3. Other meanings of the partitives, diachronic cline

The semantics represented in 2.2 can however be influenced by pragmatics. By shifting into the domain of pragmatics one may observe that the superset, the subset and the complement may be weighted or focused differently by the discourse or even remain implicit. This necessarily has essential consequences for the overall semantics and function of the b-PG in the given context which can give rise to other meanings than the true partitivity. Discourse effects must therefore be incorporated into the analysis. Thus, REED, in several works (e.g., REED 1989, 1996, 2010), projects the part-of-relation into the domain of discourse stating that partitivity function is to evoke a subgroup of an accessible, i.e. established, discourse group (REED 2010: 1739). It is this approach that provides the bases for the present analysis.

Now, as to example (5), I distinguish in this paper between the following three degrees of bleaching of the part-of-relation:

- (6) true partitivity >> restriction >> instantiation (pseudo-partitivity).

The type **restriction** is found when the complement is missing. In this case, the discursive prominence of the part-of-relation is reduced.¹ Thus, (5a)+(5b)+(5cb) introduces the superset in (5a) and the subset in (5b) but it lacks the complement. The fact that the complement does not show up in this discourse makes the discursive prominence of the

¹ I conceive of **discourse prominence** as the relative degree of **relevance or importance** that any information provided by an utterance have in a discursive interaction (cf. LANGACKER 1987).

intuitive part-of-relation weaker. This is so, because the intuitive understanding of a part presupposes that it gets in some way different treatment by the event than the remainder or the complement which remains unaffected by that particular event. In other words, there is a contrast between the subset and the complement. When, the complement is completely missing from the discourse this contrast bleaches out, the speaker and the hearer are not conscious of the contrast. They can, of course, logically retrieve the complement (if necessary). Thus, in (5a)+(5b)+(5cb) one can conclude that there are other students that lack this proficiency, but it remains on the level of implication. This discourse contains instantiations (5b) of a particular group (5a), it is meant to focus on particular individuals of the underlying group and not to focus on their part-of-relation. The partitive construction serves here to anchor or, more precisely, to characterize or restrict the subset.

With the b-PG, both the complement and the subset referents are missing from the discourse or are extremely discursively back-grounded to an extent that the respective discourse file is even not created. The subset referent is not only not mentioned explicitly, but it is not even taken up or evoked (in terms of PRINCE 1981) in the following discourse; it cannot serve as the antecedent for an anaphoric pronoun. In other words, one substantial member of the part-whole-relation is completely missing from the discourse and the other is extremely back-grounded. I will refer to this type as to the **undetermined-restrictive** and argue below that exactly this type is found with the b-PG in Ancient Greek and try to establish its functions.

The third type, the **instantiation**, is found when the downstairs position is occupied by a kind- or subkind-referring NP. In such a context, the part-of-relation exhibits even higher degree of bleaching. Additionally, the instantiation may be divided in two subtypes depending on the definiteness of the embedded NP/DP. Thus, the **faded partitives** (DE HOOP 2003: 193–199) constitute a particular subtype:

(7) Dutch

Er lagen van die dikke boeken op de tafel
 there lay of those thick books on the table
 ‘There were thick books on the table’ [DE HOOP 2003: 194, translation is mine]

The faded partitive *van die dikke boeken* in (7) not only discursively backgrounds the implicit subset to an extreme extent, but also restricts the downstairs position to kind- or subkind-referring DPs only. As has been noted by DE HOOP (2003: 193–199), they are almost synonymous with the corresponding bare plurals with one particular difference: they imply certain familiarity as to the superset on the part of the speaker. I will show that instances of the faded-partitives are also found with the b-PG in Ancient Greek. The faded partitives distinguish from the other subtype, the pseudo-partitives (cf. SELKIRK 1977; KOPIJEVSKAJA-TAMM 2001), as, e.g., in *a cup of tea* in that the former but not the latter imply certain familiarity as to the kind.

The development along the cline in (6) is straightforwardly related to the Partitive Constraint and its violations. Generally, the superset of a true partitive has to refer to sets familiar to both the speaker and the hearer, typically (but not exclusively) retrievable from the previous discourse according to the Partitive Constraint, first formulated in JACKENDOFF (1977) but see also, inter alia, BARWISE & COOPER (1981), LADUSAW (1982), DOWTY & BRODIE (1984), REED (1989), DE HOOP (1997, 2003), IONIN et al. (2006) for further discussion. Thus, crosslinguistically, the supersets of the true partitives are temporally established, discursively retrievable sets not denoting natural kinds.

However, in the course of time, a partitive expression may start accepting violations of the Partitive Constraint allowing for kind- or subkind-referring NPs to occur in its downstairs position. This change in selectional restrictions on the downstairs position is an important diagnostics – as I will argue in detail below – for the overall shift of the functional load of the partitive expression, since **kinds** are not sets in any straightforward way.

The cline in (6) is a typologically frequently attested developmental path from true partitives into pseudo-partitives (cf. KOPTJEVSKAJA-TAMM 2001). Even though the first stage, namely, the true partitivity is not found in the corpus Ancient Greek with the b-PG, it is found with the headed partitive genitive. So that it seems possible to assume that the frequently attested typological path takes place also in Ancient Greek. We observe that the most attestations of the b-PG in Ancient Greek can be described as *undetermined-restrictive*. However, there are also some examples that are instances of pseudo-partitivity or instantiation-relation. These facts can also be accommodated as a gradual progression along the cline in (6).

I summarize the three degree of bleaching in the following table:

	Stages	Upstairs position		Downstairs position
1	True partitivity	subset	complement	superset
2	Restriction	instantiation	–	restrictive/characterizing set
3	Instantiation	instantiation	–	kind or subkind

Table 1

3. Semantic properties of the superset (domain)

As stated in several works (inter alia, LYONS 1999, HEUSINGER 2002), partitives are complex constructions in that they enable a more complex determination of their referent. This is because the properties of both the subset and the head (be it overt or covert as with the b-PG) coalesce. In this section I will examine the semantic-functional properties of the superset of the b-PG before I will turn to the overall semantics of the b-PG in the next section.

3.1. Pluralic-superset-feature

Consider the following examples:

- (8) *phasi tines oinou de meth' hēmeran mē geuesthai*
 some say wine:GEN.SG PRT with-day not taste:INF.MID
 'Some say [that he] does not taste wine in the daytime' (D. L. Pyth. VIII.19)²

² Strictly speaking the PG is not bare in this example as the middle form of *geuō* 'taste' always takes the genitive, which might thus be regarded as a lexicalized (originally bare) partitive genitive. Still, this does not change the fact that the use of it here is partitive.

- (9) *Kateagē* *tēs* *kephalēs*
 break:PASS/MID.AOR.3SG the:GEN.SG head:GEN.SG
 ‘He had a hole knocked somewhere in his head’; [lit.] ‘He was broken with regard to
 some part(s) of the head.’ (Ar. Vesp. 1428; adopted from SMYTH 1920: 320)

Given the analysis of mass nouns and collectives as pluralic, i.e., consisting of a set of parts that can be countable (cf. KRIFKA 1991), an important inherent feature of the PG follows immediately from the examples adduced above: **the PG always “reads” the superset as pluralic in its (logical) number independently from its grammatical and physical number.** Thus, even though the subset is grammatically singular in (8) and (9) and both grammatically and physically singular in (9), it is automatically parcelled by the PG: in (8) *wine* is construed as consisting of many entities/parts and in (9) **the head** as having several parts. If the superset is plural then no such additional operation is applied as in (2) above. I will refer to this inherent feature of the PG as to the **pluralic-superset-feature**. It is this defragmentation feature that makes quantifiers compatible with these entities (cf. also DE HOOP 2003).

3.2. Possible values of the superset

Generally, the superset of a true partitive has to refer to sets familiar to both the speaker and the hearer, typically (but not exclusively) retrievable from the previous discourse according to the Partitive Constraint, first formulated in JACKENDOFF (1977) but see also, *inter alia*, BARWISE & COOPER (1981), LADUSAW (1982), DOWTY & BRODIE (1984), REED (1989), DE HOOP (1997, 2003), IONIN et al. (2006) for further discussion:

Partitive Constraint: the embedded NP in a partitive must be definite.

Thus, crosslinguistically, the supersets of the true partitives are temporally established, discursively retrievable sets not denoting natural kinds.

The examination of the data provided so far in the literature (e.g., in NACHMANSON 1942; KÜHNER & GERTH 1955 [1897]) reveals that the superset of the b-PG in Ancient Greek can refer to a set that is temporally established and can be identified by the hearer either from the previous discourse (10) or by knowledge, ex. (2) above.

- (10) Furthermore, once a year each governor of a province brews a bowl of **wine** in his own province, which those Scythians who have slain enemies drink; those who have not achieved this
- Ou* *geuontai* *tou* *oinou* *toutou*
 not taste:PRES.3PL the:GEN.SG wine:GEN.SG this:GEN.SG
 ‘do not taste this wine’ (Hdt. Hist. 4.66.5) (translated by GODLEY 1920, PPr)³

The Partitive Constraint may be violated by the b-PG in Ancient Greek. Thus, the superset may contain indefinites, though extremely rare, cf. (11) provided by P. O. SANDIN (p.c.):

³ Cf. fn. 2.

- (11) I think our city, if it has been rightly founded, is good in the full sense of the word. ... Clearly, then, it will be wise, brave, sober, and just. ... Then if we find any of these qualities in it, the remainder will be that which we have not found?

Hōsper *toīnyn* *allōn* *tinōn*
 as-for-instance:ADV well:PRT other:GEN.PL INDEF.PRON.GEN.PL
tettarōn,
 four:GEN.PL

‘Consider any of some other four [things].’ (Plat. Rep. 428a)

If we were looking for any of them in anything and recognized the object of our search first, that would have been enough for us, but if we had recognized the other three first, that in itself would have made known to us the thing we were seeking. For plainly there was nothing left for it to be but the remainder. “Right,” he said. “And so, since these are four, we must conduct the search in the same way.” “Clearly.” (translated by SHOREY 1969, PPr)

Socrates suggests by the sentence in (11) to test his method on any other four things, not the four things he mentions before, namely, *wise*, *brave*, *sober*, and *just*. Note that the speaker (Socrates) does not bear any specific four things in mind, in contrary, suggesting that his definition will hold for any group of four things. The b-PG has lost partitive semantics but the function it seems to have here is to appeal to ‘some other four things’ as to an arbitrary collective set that is going to be treated in the following discourse. The indefinite and non-specific value of the downstairs position vehemently violates the Partitive Constraint.

Remarkably, the Ancient Greek b-PG attests downstairs positions denoting (often definite) kinds or subkinds, cf. (12) adopted from LASSO DE LA VEGA (1958: 466):

- (12) In this sandy desert are ants, not as big as dogs but bigger than foxes

Eisi *gar* *autōn*
 be:ACT.3PL PRT they:GEN.PL
kai para basilei tōi Perseōn entheuten thēreuthentes
 and at king the of Persians there caught
 [lit.] ‘There are [some] of them at the king of Persians that were caught there’; ‘The king of Persians has some of them’ (Hdt. Hist. 3.102)⁴

The b-PG *autōn* ‘of them’ refers back to *ants* in the previous sentence. Though, logically, it does not encode a subset of the superset ‘*the ants that are not as big as dogs but bigger than foxes and that live in the sandy desert*’, since there is no complement set here. That is to say, those ants that live at the king’s palace do not constitute a part of those that live in the *sandy desert*, which, in turn, do not constitute the complement but rather a full set/kind not missing any of its members. Thus, (13) can be paraphrased with (13a) but not with (13b)

- (13a) *The king of Persians has some of that kind of species that otherwise live in the sandy desert.*

- (13b) *The king of Persians has some of them while the others live in the sandy desert.*

⁴ I have argued elsewhere (SERŽANT 2012) that the passive participle *caught* should not be regarded as an overt head in this example, following, inter alia, NACHMANSON (1942), CONTI (2010).

The problem in interpreting (12) as a subset/superset-relation grounds in the fact that the embedded NP ‘they’ is not a superset, or even, a typical set at all. The embedded NP provides here the reference to a particular kind, referring rather to the properties and characteristics of the *ants* described above (13a), but not as to a set (13b). I will argue below that (12) is an instance of a pseudo-partitive.

4. Semantic-functional properties of the subset

4.1. Introduction

The partitivity reading in narrow sense, i.e. the subset being a part of the superset, is very often assumed to be one of the core functions of the b-PG in Ancient Greek, especially in the classical scholarly tradition. However, already CHANTRAINE (1963: 51) assumes that the function of the b-PG is to encode **indefinite quantity**, cf. also LURAGHI (2003: 60). NAPOLI (2010: 37) provides a more precise definition **non-specified quantification**. While these assumptions coherently account for several instances of the b-PG, I will argue below that other examples do not fit any of these suggestions.

LURAGHI (2003: 60–62) assumes that the semantics of the b-PG are similar to English *some*; similarly BELLETTI (1988: 1) for Finnish. Indeed, in most of the cases this approach accounts for the function of the b-PG adequately. Nevertheless, I will try to capture the function of the b-PG more precisely. Before I discuss this approach, I will briefly mention the difference, following MILSARK (1974 [1979]), between unstressed *some* (quoted as *sm*) and stressed *SOME*, which is never shortened (MILSARK 1977, DIESING 1992, HOEKSEMA 1996, LYONS 1999, HEUSINGER 2002: 260–261); contrast (14) and (15) from HOEKSEMA (1996: 2):

(14) *Some senators were acting strange* (*There is a set of strange-acting senators*)

(15) *SOME senators were acting strange* (*Part of the senators was acting strange*)

Sm patterns rather with an indefinite (plural) article while *SOME* emphasizes the indefinite quantity. Thus, *sm* is opposed to, e.g., *the*, while *SOME* is opposed to, e.g., *all* or *none*. Only the *SOME* type with the presupposed set is generally considered to encode partitivity.

Now, turning back to the b-PG in Ancient Greek, it must be stated that English *some* corresponds first of all to Ancient Greek *tines* or *enioi* (quoted here in NOM.M.PL) or *ti* (NOM.SG.NEUT) that are exactly parallel to English *some* by having the reading ‘*SOME*’ alongside ‘*sm*’:

(16) *kai apethanon tines autōn*
 and die:AOR.3PL some:NOM.PL they:GEN.PL
 ‘... and *SOME* of them died’ (X. Hell. 6.5.13)

There are, however, essential differences between these determiners (*tines*, *enioi*, *ti*) and the b-PG. First, there are differences in discursive properties. While *tines*, *enioi* or *ti* can optionally be discursively foregrounded, the actual participant (the subset) encoded by the b-PG cannot. Given that discourse prominence is a matter of degree, I assume that *tines* and *enioi* are generally higher in discourse prominence than the inherently covert actual participant of the b-PG. Second, they are less grammaticalized, preserving their status as lexical items to a greater extent in that they are not syntactically bound and present almost

no phonetic cohesion with their syntactic complement. By contrast, the b-PG, being a case ending, is fully grammaticalized. Third, there are crucial differences in terms of grammatical function between the b-PG and the determiners *tines* or *enioi* (NOM.M.PL) or *ti* (NOM.SG.NEUT). The b-PG is not specified for number (NAPOLI 2010), determination or even case. This is essentially different from the constructions with *tines/enioi/ti* as they are always **marked** for indefinite number and case. Finally, there are also differences in terms of their semantics: the kind/subkind reading is unavailable with any of these determiners, while it is frequent with the b-PG (see below).

In what follows I will show that the subset of the b-PG is neither (grammatically) marked for cardinality (subsection 4.2) nor for indefiniteness (subsection 4.3).

4.2. Does the b-PG encode indefinite quantity or partial affectedness?

Examples in this subsection show that the b-PG is not found in contexts explicitly discussing (indefinite) quantity or partial affectedness. Thus, the b-PG is never contextually opposed to any quantifier such as *all*, *none*, etc., of the same superset.

- (17) Sickle-maker: Trygaeus, my best of friends, what a fine stroke of business you have done for me by bringing back Peace! Formerly my sickles would not have sold at an obolus apiece, today I am being paid fifty drachmae for every one. And here is a neighbor who is selling his casks for the country at three drachmae each. So come,

<i>Trygaie</i>	<i>tōn</i>	<i>drepanōn</i>	<i>te</i>	<i>lambane</i>	<i>kai</i>
Trygaeus:VOC	the:GEN.PL	sickle:GEN.PL	and	take:IMPV	and
<i>tōnde</i>	<i>ho</i>	<i>ti</i>	<i>boulei</i>	<i>proika</i>	
these:GEN.PL	what	ever	you-want	free-of-charge	

‘Trygaeus, take [from] sickles and those [casks], what ever you want, for free!’

Accept them for nothing; it’s because of our handsome profits on our sales that we offer you these wedding presents. (Ar. Pax 1203 ff., translated by O’NEILL 1938, PPr)

As has been suggested in the literature, the b-PG can, indeed, have the value of indefinite quantity or partial affectedness as in example (17). In this example, the quantity is, indeed, indefinite. It seems, however, that the focus of attention does not lie on the indefinite quantity. The message the speaker (the Sickle-maker) intends here to convey has nothing to do with the quantity of the sickles and casks Trygaeus should take. It is not his intention to encode partitivity or partial affectedness and to say ‘take some though not all of them’. In (17), the speaker does not necessarily presuppose or, more precisely, does not commit himself to the existence of a complement group of sickles and casks in the given discourse: not *‘take some sickles and casks but leave the others ...’ which would have been expected in a true partitive relation. The function the b-PG has here is rather the **restrictive** reading with undetermined instantiations, like [lit.] ‘take undetermined-instantiations of those sickles and casks that I have/that have been discussed previously’. The b-PG patterns here semantically with a restrictive relative subclause. As to the indefinite quantity, logically, the instantiations affected will constitute a subpart of the sickles and casks the Sickle-maker has. This is, however, only an implication and not part of the message. Notably, this implication does not even need to hold. The next example shows even more clearly that it is not the indefinite quantity/partial affectedness/partitivity that is being conveyed by the b-PG:

- (18) *antapekteinan de kai hoi en Peiraiei tōn*
 against.kill:AOR.3PL but also the:NOM.PL in Piraeus the:GEN.PL
hippeōn ep' agrou labontes Kallistraton
 cavalryman:GEN.PL on countryside capture:partc.NOM.PL Callistratus:ACC
 'In retaliation, the men in Piraeus killed [one] of the cavalymen, having captured [him] in the countryside, [namely] Callistratus.' (X. Hell. 2.4.27.1–3)
- (19) *Adrēstoio egēme thygaterōn*
 Adrastos:GEN.SG marry:AOR.3SG daughter:GEN.PL
 'He married a daughter of Adrastos' (Hom. Il. 14.121, from KÜHNER & GERTH 1955 [1897]:345)
- (20) *Sigān epēines':*
 be silent!
hōs ep' exodōi kluō tōn endothen
 as at exit hear:PRES.1SG the:GEN.PL inside:ADV
chōrountos
 go:PARTC.PRES.ACT.GEN.SG
 'Be silent! I hear as (if) [one] of them inside coming out at the exist' (S. El. 1322)

In (18), the logical number of the subset of the b-PG *tōn hippeōn* 'of the cavalymen' is *one* as indicated later in the sentence by the name of the only cavalryman affected. The number is, hence, **one** and not indefinite. In example (19) Diomedes speaks about his father marrying his mother ('**one** of the daughters of Adrastos'). Again, the logical number of the subset of the b-PG is **one** and, hence, definite. In (20), the embedded participial subclause *tōn endothen chōrountos* has the logical subject in the b-PG⁵ *tōn endothen* 'of the [ones] inside' but its participial predicate *chōrountos* is singular indicating that the subset is singular ('[someone] walking of the [ones] inside:sg') and, hence, definite. If the b-PG would have been marked for an indefinite number as English 'SOME' such occurrences should have been impossible, cf. English:

(21b) **the men in Piraeus killed SOME of the cavalymen, ..., namely, Callistratus*

(21b) **He married SOME of Adrastos' daughters ... [namely, Deiphyle/my mother]*

Even though there is still a logical part-of-relation, this relation is not part of the message that the speaker intends to convey, it constitutes only an implication. Obviously, the speaker does not intend to say that the superset 'Adrastos' daughters' was only partially (as opposed to holistically) affected. The intention is rather to discursively anchor Adrastos who is the point of the message to be conveyed. The semantics is thus to restrict the reference of the actual participant leaving its instantiation undetermined. The indefinite quantity does not account also for the next example in which, after Lydia was conquered by the Persians, the king of Lydians, Croisos, decided to send an embassy to the oracle in Delphi to ask why he was so misguided by it:

⁵ I have argued elsewhere (SERZANT 2012) that the participle 'the going [one]' should not be regarded as an overt head in this example, cf. also NACHMANSON (1942).

- (22) Croesus repeated ... the story of all his own aspirations, and the answers of the oracles, and more particularly his offerings, and how the oracle had encouraged him to attack the Persians

... *ho Kroisos, pempōn tōn*
 the:NOM Croisos:NOM send:PARTC.PRES.NOM.SG the:GEN.PL

Lydōn

Lydians:GEN.PL

‘... Croisos, sending (some of the) Lydians’ (Hdt. Hist. 1.90.4)

telling [them] to lay his chains on the doorstep of the temple, and to ask the god if he were not ashamed to have persuaded Croesus to attack the Persians

From this context it follows that the speaker did not intend to encode partial affectedness of the Lydians: **only SOME have been sent to Delphi while the others remained with the (former) king.*

The next examples show that indefinite quantity is only a default, defeasible implication: it remains true only as long as the partitive genitive is not headed by an overt quantifier (differently, NAPOLI 2010: 37):

- (23) *metron men oun ti tou hydatos pāsin*
 measure:NOM but PRT a:NOM the:GEN.SG water:GEN.SG them

anankaion einai piein

necessary be drink

‘they were all required to drink a measure of the water’ (Pl. R. 621a.6–7) (from NAPOLI 2010: 35)

- (24) *parelthōn heis tōn ephorōn tote ...*
 come.by:PARTC.ACT.NOM one:NOM the:GEN.PL ephor:GEN.PL then

elxen tois Lakedaimoniois hōde

said Lacedaemonians so

‘Then one of the ephors came forward and addressed the Lacedaemonians as follows’ (Hdt. Hist. 1.85.3)

The quantifier *metron ti* ‘a particular measure’ quantifies the subset of the PG *tou hydatos*, analogically, the quantifier *heis* ‘one’ quantifies the subset of the PG in (24). Furthermore, the PG can combine with the universal quantifier ‘all’:

- (25) *xunōmnysan de kai Samiōn*
 swear:AOR.3PL but also Samian:GEN.PL
pantes ton auton orkon hoi en tēi hēlikiai
 all:NOM.PL the same oath the:NOM.PL in the age
 ‘All the Samians of age also swore the same oath.’ (Thuc. Hist. 8.75.3)
 (adopted from KÜHNER & GERTH 1955 [1897]: 339)

From the examples adduced it follows that the partitive genitive does not mark an NP/DP for indefinite quantity, the indefinite quantity is an optional implication being a default that can readily be cancelled by the context as in (18)–(20) or any overt determiner as in (23)–(25). Being an optional default implication the indefinite quantity cannot be considered as the core function of the b-PG. I have also argued that the partial affectedness equally cannot be regarded as the core function.

4.3. Does the b-PG encode indefiniteness?

Examples (18) and (19) have the implicational value of the indefinite specificity (epistemic specificity in HEUSINGER 2002: 260). This value is only context-induced as the next example with a non-referential value shows:

- (26) *k-an gamēi pot' autos*
 and-if marry:SUBJ.3SG ever he:NOM.SG
ē tōn sungenōn ē tōn philōn,
 either the:GEN.PL relatives:GEN.PL or the:GEN.PL friends:GEN.PL
 'If he or anyone of his relatives or of his friends will ever marry...' (Ar. Nub. 1128 f, adopted from POULTNEY 1936: 76)

The b-PGs *tōn sungenōn* 'of the relatives' and *tōn philōn* 'of the friends' have subkind meaning in that the utterance will have the same truth-conditions with every and each instantiation of it. The non-referential value referring to a subkind is also found in example (27) adopted from NACHMANSON (1942) and LASSO DE LA VEGA (1958). The passage in (27) describes the behaviour of birds in winter, whether they fly away or hide somewhere:

- (27) *phōlousi d' ouden diakekrimenōs kai tōn*
 lurk:PRES.3PL PRT no distinguished:ADV and the:GEN.PL
gampsōnychōn kai tōn euthuōnuchōn
 crooked-taloned:GEN.PL and the:GEN.PL wide-taloned:GEN.PL
 'Those with the crooked and those with straight talons, indistinguishably, hide.' (and not fly away) (Arist. Hist. Anim. VIII.16)
 ... for instance, the stork, the ouzel, the turtle-dove, and the lark, all go into hiding. The case of the turtledove is the most notorious of all, for we would defy any one to assert that he had anywhere seen a turtle-dove in winter-time; at the beginning of the hiding time it is exceedingly plump, and during this period it moults, but retains its plumpness. Some cushats hide; others, instead of hiding, migrate at the same time as the swallow. (translated by THOMPSON 1910 [1990])

The **hiding** property does apply indistinguishably to instantiations of both subkinds ('the crooked- and the straight-taloned birds') even though the context implies exceptions. But as pointed out in LYONS (1999: 179) generics are distinguished from the universal quantifiers in that only the former tolerate exceptions. Even though the generic interpretation in (26) or (27) can be attributed to the characterizing type of those sentences (see for details KRIFKA et al. 1995), the generic or subkind-referring value of the b-PG is also found with the **particular sentence type** (as defined in KRIFKA et al. 1995), e.g. with consumption verbs (see the examples in NAPOLI 2010; cf. also DAHL 2009: 40) so that the generic value of the b-PG is attested independently of the sentence type.

There is another argument against the claim that the b-PG encodes indefiniteness. Even though partitive constructions typically do not allow indexical determiners (HOEKSEMA 1984, DE HOOP 1997: 157), this is not the case with the partitive genitive in Ancient Greek, which merely does not impose any lexical restrictions on the upstairs position. It can be filled out by the article (there is only one, definite article), by a personal pronoun or by any demonstrative; cf. (28) headed by the definite article, or by an indefinite determiner in (29–30). The indefiniteness implication is thereby cancelled:

- (28) *ho tōn hepta sophōtatos Solōn*
 the:NOM.SG the:GEN.PL seven wise:SUPERL.NOM.SG Solon:NOM.SG
 ‘Solon the wisest of the Seven [Sages]’ (Pl. Tim. 20d)
- (29) *katebale gar tis tōn Plataiōn*
 throw.down:AOR.3SG PRT INDEF-one.NOM the:GEN.PL Plataeans:GEN.PL
keramida
 tile
 ‘One of the Plataeans ... threw down a tile.’ (Thuc. Hist. 3.22.4.2–3)
- (30) *kai apethanon tines autōn*
 and die:AOR.3PL indefinite-ones:NOM.PL they:GEN.PL
 ‘And some of them died’ (X. Hell. 4.4.17)

The partitive genitive does not mark indefiniteness on its NP/DP, since an NP/DP that is inherently marked as indefinite can occur with neither a definite nor an indefinite determiner; cf. English **the a man*, **the any man*, **the sm men*, **a sm man*, **a any man* etc. Thus, the assumption of indefiniteness being the core function of the partitive genitive contained in the b-PG cannot be maintained. As with the indefinite quantity, the indefiniteness of the b-PG is a defeasible, default implication and can be readily cancelled by the context.

4.4. Scope of the subset

The following examples illustrate that the participant encoded by the b-PG in Ancient Greek has inherently narrow scope with such operators as negation; cf.:

- (31) *kai tas men tettaras phylas tōn Athēnaiōn prin ek tēs diōxeōs epanachōrēsai parēlthon*
 they passed by the other four tribes of the Athenians before the latter had returned from the pursuit
hōste ouk apethanon autōn plēn ei tis en tēi symbolēi
 so.that NEG die:AOR.ACT.3.PL they:GEN.PL except one in the encounter
hupo Tegeatōn
 by the Tegeans
 ‘They passed by the other four tribes of the Athenians before the latter had returned from the pursuit, so that none of these were killed except such as fell in the original encounter, at the hands of the Tegeans.’ (adopted from NACHMANSON 1942: 24 and LASSO DE LA VEGA 1958: 468)

The next example of the b-PG under negation (adopted from POULTNEY 1936: XIII; NACHMANSON 1942: 16; LASSO DE LA VEGA 1958: 465) shows that the negated context attracts the b-PG in order to encode that the described *whole* is beyond the existence, i.e., cannot be made referential:

- (32) *panta pephraktai k-ouk estin opēs*
 all:NOM.PL.NEUT seal:PERF.3SG and-not be:3SG hole:GEN.SG
oud’ ei serphōi diadynai
 not if gnat get-through
 ‘Everything is sealed fast; and there is no hole that even a gnat could get through.’
 (Ar. Vesp. 352)

The inherent narrow scope is another finding that will be taken up in the next section.

The utterance in (32) is emphatic and implies literally ‘there is no instantiation of the kind hole such that the gnat could get through’.

5. Evaluation of the findings, establishing the function of the b-PG

5.1. *Semantics of the b-PG*

In section 4 above, I have shown that the b-PG is neither marked as an indefinite determiner nor as an indefinite quantifier. I have shown that the b-PG can indeed be indefinite (as assumed previously, *inter alia*, by BELLETTI 1988: 5; HOEKSEMA 1996: 17) or generic (cf. NAPOLI 2010), though these values are only **default and defeasible** values. The b-PG also tolerates the specific value (epistemic specificity in HEUSINGER 2002; HEUSINGER & KORNFILT 2005) inferred by the context but it does not encode it. The same is true for the domain of quantification: the b-PG may imply unspecified quantity (cf. NAPOLI 2010) by default but need not: it is infinite only as long as there is no overt quantifier to head it and/or no context that would defeat the indefinite-quantity-implication.

Furthermore, as follows from the examples adduced, the participant encoded by the b-PG is never taken up in the following discourse and it is never mentioned in the previous discourse. This participant is never stored in the discourse model, cannot be antecedent for an anaphoric pronoun and has inherently narrow scope with such operators as negation. The same is true for the complement. Thus, important differences as regards true partitivity have been evinced: both the subset and the complement are inherently backgrounded and exclusively implicit, while only the superset retains its discursive prominence. I have demonstrated that the logical part-of-relation is never part of the discourse with the b-PG or, more precisely, of the message the speaker intends to convey. The logical part-of-relation has retreated from being the core meaning to being an implicature, as in example (33).

Additionally, the data show that the downstairs NP/DP does not provide a superset of particular entities of which only some are referred to by the upstairs covert position. Instead, I suggest that the downstairs position only provides a restrictive description of the entities that were affected by the event, it gives characteristics of the set the covert actual participant belongs to or is characterized by and, if the set is definite, it provides in a way a referentially determined kind/subkind/descriptive-set of the actual participant. This can be seen on the fact that the downstairs position of the b-PG is frequently occupied by a kind- or subkind-referring NP/DP that cannot be conceived of as a superset, since it is not a finite “ad-hoc” set of members but rather an infinite class that unites entities along some particular property/-ies. We observe, thus, a semantic deviation from the true partitivity in the downstairs position of the b-PG: a finite and definite superset of which particular members are deducted in order to get special treatment by the event has developed into a merely restrictive or characterizing, sometimes (with the pseudo-partitives) kind-referring expression. Accordingly, the upstairs position does not encode a subset anymore but rather instantiation(s) of the kind/subkind or restricted/characterizing set. I believe that this deviation is the result of a diachronic change along the scale in (6) from the true partitivity towards pseudo-partitivity observed in a number of languages (cf. KOPTJEVSKAJA-TAMM 2001).

Thus, as I mentioned, example (33)=(12) illustrates a kind of a faded partitive (as described in DE HOOP 2003: 193–199) and pseudo-partitive with the discursively anchored kind:

- (33) In this sandy desert are ants, not as big as dogs but bigger than foxes

<i>Eisi</i>	<i>gar</i>	<i>autōn</i>			
be:ACT.3PL	PRT	they:GEN.PL			
<i>kai para</i>	<i>basilei tōi</i>	<i>Perseōn</i>	<i>entheuten</i>	<i>thēreuthentes</i>	
and at	king the	of Persians	there	caught	

[lit.] ‘There are [some] of them at the king of Persians that were caught there’; ‘The king of Persians has some of them’ (Hdt. Hist. 3.102)

Note that the pronoun *autōn* does not provide the immediate back-reference to the antecedent’s referent but re-links it to the instantiations of the antecedent’s kind. In (33), one cannot even think of a complement to those ants that live at the king of Persians, since the ants that live in the sandy desert do not represent a set that lacks some of its members in order to be complete.

Allowing for kinds to occur in the downstairs position indicates an essential progression along the putative diachronic cline in (6). It is possible that this shift has been triggered by the ambiguity of the third person pronouns as in (33) that crosslinguistically tend to have additionally the kind reading, cf. (34) from AHLO (1992: 1, 12–13):

- (34) *Mark knows ten linguists, and Freddie knows six of them*

The superset of the English partitive construction *six of them* can have two readings (kind- and set reading according to AHLO 1992):

- (34a) *Mark knows ten linguists, and Freddie knows six linguists*

- (34b) *Mark knows ten linguists, and Freddie knows six of the ten linguists that Mark knows*

The meaning of (34a) is encoded by the partitive case in Finnish, thus constituting the reference to six instantiations of the kind that the NP *ten linguists* of the preceding clause belongs to. At the same time, the meaning in (34b) will be encoded by the new partitive case (KIPARSKY 1998), namely, the elative case. Thus, AHLO (1992: 1) writes that the partitive makes reference to kinds while the elative makes reference to sets (supersets). As regards the cline in (6), this is indicative of the functional shift of the Finnish partitive case from encoding **true partitivity** into encoding **instantiation** (as described above in section 1). In the same way, the new partitive construction based on the ablative PP *ek* or *apo* ‘from, off’ with gen. in Ancient Greek (NACHMANSON 1942) has primarily true partitive semantics in Ancient Greek while the partitive genitive is shifting towards instantiation.

SELKIRK (1977) and KOPTJEVSKAJA-TAMM (2001) observe this development from partitive ‘a cup of that good tea’ towards pseudo-partitive ‘a cup of tea’ with no part-of-relation anymore exemplifying this cline for the overtly headed partitives.

This cline is found with the bare partitives as well, which, however, due to their bareness lend themselves to deviation from true partitivity. Thus, the faded partitives based on the Dutch *van* (DE HOOP 2003: 193–199) but also probably the French *de* and Italian *di* demonstrate the development towards restricting the input of the downstairs position to only natural kinds or subkinds. E.g., the French *de* only allows for generics in the downstairs position (LYONS 1999: 100–101). I maintain, following SELKIRK (1977), KOPTJEVSKAJA-

TAMM (2001) and DE HOOP (2003: 193–199) that pseudo- and faded partitives do not encode partitivity anymore. The reinterpretation of the superset into a natural kind/subkind bleaches the part-of-relation to a great extent; additionally, the notion of the complement thereby loses its substance. Partitives of this type pattern semantically rather with a DP, e.g., *the man*, where the NP *man* constitutes a kind and the determiner *the* encodes a (particular) instantiation of that kind.

I summarize:

Semantics of the b-PG:

The b-PG in Ancient Greek is a grammatical means to encode undetermined instantiations by referring to their hypercategory which can be either the respective kind or subkind or a set restrictive and descriptive in nature. It allows the speaker to make no commitment as to the quantity, referentiality and semantic role of these instantiation(s); this/these instantiation(s) have inherently narrow scope (e.g. with negation).

Under this account it is expected that the b-PG patterns semantically somewhat similar to the bare plural NPs in, e.g., English which also encode undetermined instantiations of a particular kind. The bare plural NPs in English are also undetermined only by default; they can also be combined with any overt determiner or a quantifier. Furthermore, the bare plural NPs in English are also compatible with the generic meaning. This may be due to their undeterminacy as to quantification which, in turn, allow for implying all members of a kind, cf. the noun *trees* in (a) *I saw trees* and (b) *Trees grow slowly*. While (a) imply an indefinite quantity of the instantiations, (b) assumes the generic value. This is exactly parallel to the b-PG which may also imply all available instantiations due to its undeterminacy, cf. (35) below.

Having defined the semantics of the b-PG, I address the question as to the function of the b-PG in Ancient Greek and as to what purposes these semantics are employed in Ancient Greek. I will suggest that the main function of the b-PG is to serve the discursive purposes demonstrated in the next subsection.

5.2. Discourse function of the b-PG

As has been shown, the first approximation to the functional semantics of the b-PG to English *some*, as suggested in LURAGHI (2003: 60 ff.), has been useful but fails to account for several cases. The main problem with it is that *some* is an **overt** determiner and quantifier and, hence, cannot – already at this point – exactly match the function of an unrealized, or rather fully implicit, determiner or a quantifier of the b-PG. I believe that the bareness of the b-PG is the main clue for its semantic-functional properties.

In what follows I will argue that the function of the b-PG in Ancient Greek is discourse-driven. Several works have already shown that certain language expressions are inherently discourse-driven (see the overview in REED 1996: 143). The speaker, while figuring out what is important in her/his message and what can be left out, may result with different construals that are the same in terms of their truth conditions but distinguished (inter alia) in the intended focus of attention. To put it in terms of LANGACKER (1990; 2008: 77 ff., 259 ff.), the speaker makes the decision as to which parts of her/his message should be profiled onto the onstage and which onto the offstage. The speaker may not intend to provide more

precise information about particular entities of her/his message and their relations to other entities either because he does “not want to share this knowledge, or else he does not presuppose interest in such a sharing of knowledge on the part of the speaker” (HEUSINGER & KORNFILT 2005: 41, cf. also GIVÓN 1978: 293). Recall example (19) above (repeated here as 35):

- (35) *Adrēstoio egēme thygaterōn*
 Adrastos:GEN.SG marry:AOR.3SG daughter:GEN.PL
 ‘He married a daughter of Adrastos’ (Hom. Il. 14.121, adopted from KÜHNER & GERTH 1955 [1897]: 345)

In this example, the speaker, Diomedes explains in front of the other Greek warriors how noble his origin is. While actually talking about his mother and, hence, being theoretically capable of supplying the exact reference, he refers to her as ‘[one] of Adrastus’ daughters’, because the information he wants to focus on is not his mother herself but rather how noble his father is, since his wife’s father was Adrastus, i.e. the king of Argos, one of the most powerful and noble men in Mycenaean Greece.

I claim that the core function of the b-PG in Ancient Greek is to link the empathy focus (cf. KUNO & KABURAKI 1977) of a discourse to the restrictive and characterizing set/(sub)kind of the actual participant and to detract it from it from the actual participant, i.e. from the instantiations of that set/(sub)kind. The b-PG thereby endows the actual participant with an inherent discursive backgroundedness, implicitness. Thus, the downstairs NPs/DPs can easily be topics or foci while the actual participant cannot. This discursive promotion of the restrictive set/kind and the demotion of the actual participant (instantiation) is the core function of the b-PG. This discourse function of the b-PG explains why the b-PG is not found with prototypical agents in Ancient Greek (and probably crosslinguistically) since the agent is prototypically the most prominent semantic role (cf. the semantic roles’ hierarchy in GRIMSHAW 1990, ALSINA 1996).

Furthermore, the fact that the b-PG is sometimes found with a generic interpretation is expected under this assumption. With generics, particular instantiations are discursively irrelevant, what matters is a certain property that pertains to the whole set/kind. Cf. example (28) repeated as (36) for convenience:

- (36) *phōlousi d’ ouden diakekrimenōs kai tōn*
 lurk:PRES.3PL PRT no distinguished:ADV and the:GEN.PL
gampsōnychōn kai tōn euthyōnychōn
 crooked-taloned:GEN.PL and the:GEN.PL wide-taloned:GEN.PL
 ‘[Both kinds of birds] with the crooked and the straight talons, indistinguishably, do hide.’ (and not fly away) (Arist. Hist. Anim. VIII.16)
 ... for instance, the stork, the owzel, the turtle-dove, and the lark, all go into hiding. The case of the turtledove is the most notorious of all, for we would defy any one to assert that he had anywhere seen a turtle-dove in winter-time; at the beginning of the hiding time it is exceedingly plump, and during this period it moults, but retains its plumpness. Some cushats hide; others, instead of hiding, migrate at the same time as the swallow. (translated by THOMPSON 1910 [1990])

What discursively matters in this sentence is that the class of the ‘crook-taloned birds’ and the class of the ‘straight-taloned birds’ do hide and not fly away. The particular instantiations (subset), i.e. those birds of both classes that fly away are not relevant for the

message of the utterance in (36). The b-PG allows the speaker to speak in terms of the hypercategories and not in terms of basic level instantiations, to zoom out from particular instantiations.

The b-PG is also very frequently found in the predicative position. It is exactly this position in which the affiliation to a certain kind is asserted whereas particular instantiations of that kind are irrelevant. Thus, in example (37) the kind ‘nine archons’ (i.e. the nine “minister” that the Attic government consisted of) is the point of the utterance whereas a particular instantiation, i.e. the particular archon that the speaker might be elected to, is demoted by leaving it unexpressed:

- (37) *Ti me kōlyei klērousthai tōn*
 what me hinder:PRES.3SG draw-a-lot:PASS/MID.INF the:GEN.PL
ennea archontōn
 nine archon:GEN.PL
 ‘What prevents me from being elected by lot as [one] of the nine archons?’ (Lys. Or. 24. 13), adopted from KÜHNER & GERTH (1955 [1897]:375)

The point of (37) is basically ‘what keeps me from becoming a part of the Attic archon-government?!’, the speaker focuses on the kind, not on a particular instantiation. Examples (38), (39) are analogous:

- (38) *houtoi tōn geraiterōn gignontai*
 these:NOM.PL the:GEN.PL elder:GEN.PL become:PRES.3PL
 ‘Those become the elders.’ (X. Cyr. 1.2.15, adopted from KÜHNER & GERTH 1955 [1897]:372)
- (39) *Ē tōn ponērōn ēstha kai toichōrychōn?*
 PRT the:GEN.PL villainous:GEN.PL be:PERF.2SG and thief:GEN.PL
 ‘Weren’t you a villainous thief?’ (Ar. Plu. 869)

This discourse function is also useful with the verbs of consumption which usually are used in the contexts where particular instantiations of the food/liquid parts to be consumed are less relevant for the message while only the type of the food affected matters. The frequent occurrence of the b-PG with the verbs of consumption in Ancient Greek (NAPOLI 2010) and crosslinguistically is thus expected, cf. (40) adopted from LURAGHI (2003: 60):

- (40) ‘Antinous ... was on the point of raising to his lips a fair goblet, a two-eared cup of gold, and was even now handling it,
ophra pioi oinoio
 so.that drink:OPT.PRES.3SG wine:GEN.SG
 ‘in order to drink sm wine’ (Hom. Od. 22.11)
 and death was not in his thoughts. For who among men that sat at meat could think that one man among many, how strong soever he were, would bring upon himself evil death and black fate? But Odysseus took aim, and smote him with an arrow in the throat. (translation by MURRAY 1919, PPr)

The context of example (40) clearly indicates that the point for the use of the b-PG *oinoio* ‘of wine’ in this utterance is neither to indicate that the speaker is not really sure about how much wine Antinous would want to drink (= indefinite quantity approach), nor is it to indicate that Antinous is not going to drink all the wine in the cup or of the world but

only a part of it. The sense of the utterance in (40) is to inform the hearer that Antinous was about to drink *wine* immediately before he was killed by Odysseus. In this context, the narrator obviously does not consider it necessary to dwell on the properties of those parts of the wine, that were to be consumed, consciously; he does not go into the determinative and quantificational properties of the wine parts affected leaving them unassigned. The b-PG focuses here on the kind, namely, *wine* as opposed to, e.g., *water* or *milk*.

It is analogically with the verbs of desire which often are used in contexts where a certain kind of things is desired, not its particular instantiation (cf. the inherent narrow scope of the b-PG). Several verbs of desire have lexicalized the b-PG in Ancient Greek:

- (41) *Hostis pollōn de chrēmātōn epithymeī*
 which:NOM many:GEN.PL PRT money:GEN.PL be-eager:PRES.3SG
 ‘who is eager [to have] much money ...’ (X. Mem. 2.6.3)

In (41) the subset of the partitive genitive *pollōn chrēmātōn* ‘of much money’ (here lexicalized by the verb) is not discursively relevant. In fact, the person being eager for money is not eager for any particular money but rather for any arbitrary instantiations of the underlying kind *money*. The same is true of such verbs like *deuō/deō* ‘be short of’.

Summing up, I define the core function of the b-PG as follows:

Discourse Function of the b-PG:

The b-PG links the focus of attention to the (downstairs) kind/subkind/characterizing or restrictive set and detracts it from the actual participant; the actual participant’s reference is not stored in the discourse model. The b-PG allows the speaker to zoom out from the actual participant and view it in terms of one of its hypercategories (subkind, kind, characterizing set).

The b-PG decreases the resolution or the degree of granularity and increases the schematicity (as understood in LANGACKER 2008: 55) and is, hence, a matter of construal rather than of truth conditions.

Beside the examples adduced above the Discourse Function of the b-PG explains also why the b-PG is so frequently used in titles and headlines in Ancient Greek (cf. *Thematischer Genitiv* in NACHMANSON 1942: 42; KÜHNER & GERTH 1955 [1897]: 363 n. 11). This is because the headlines provide information about the kind or the set of particular things whose instantiations are going to be discussed by the text without, however, focusing on particular instantiations of that kind or set.

6. Summary and conclusions

The b-PG is a morphologically marked, non-default strategy to encode participants of an event. The b-PG overrides the default case-marking (e.g., assigned by the predicate) in order to encode particular semantics and particular discourse function.

I have defined the semantics of the b-PG in Ancient Greek as a device that encodes undetermined instantiations by referring to their hypercategory which can be either the respective kind or subkind or a set restrictive and descriptive in nature. The characterizing set/kind/subkind is often discursively definite, i.e. mentioned previously, or can be otherwise identified. I have tried to show that the b-PG does not encode part-of-relation (true partitivity); it does not encode unspecified quantity or indefiniteness.

Probably the original true partitivity semantics, i.e. encoding subset of a superset, has been lost. The inherent backgroundedness of the complement and the subset must have played a crucial role in this change.

The semantics of the b-PG makes it to an important discursive tool. It allows the speaker to zoom out from the actual participant and to speak about it in terms of one of its hypercategories (i.e. the characterizing set or its subkind or kind). In a way similar to the passive, the b-PG is an additional operation to discursively invert the basic or default discourse prominence. I have claimed that the b-PG is mainly discursively driven. Under the assumption that the b-PG is subject to speaker's construal, one expects not to find a strict correlation between particular grammatical contexts and the occurrences of the b-PG attested. In other words, this claim accounts for non-predictability of the occurrences of the b-PG found in Ancient Greek corpus in terms of solid grammatical rules. The Discursive Function of the b-PG explains why partitives are sometimes found in unbounded contexts in languages such as Finnish (KIPARSKY 1998). In fact, it has been suggested that the b-PG can induce an unbounded interpretation, especially with ingestion verbs in Ancient Greek and Vedic Sanskrit (DAHL 2009: 37–41; NAPOLI 2010). Under the present account this is expected because speaking in terms of kinds or characterizing/descriptive sets does not allow measuring out the event in terms of a bounded incremental theme. The progress degree of an event can only be controlled or measured by a verbal argument if the latter is conceptualized in terms of its particular instantiation that have been affected by the event and, hence, can be quantitatively measured. The high zoom-out factor of the b-PG does not allow one to “see” the instantiations and, thereby, blocks their quantificational perception. The same line of argumentation can be provided for the b-PG in generic contexts.

There seems to be no grammatically conditioned rule that would require an object to take the b-PG in order to mark unboundedness of the event which is expressed at another position in Ancient Greek, namely, at the predicate by means of verbal morphology (cf. also similar argumentation for Latin b-PG in BAUER 2007: 134). Thus, one finds alternations between ACC and b-PG with both aspectually bounded as aorist and aspectually unbounded as imperfect or present marked predicates in Ancient Greek and Vedic.

The inherent discursive backgroundedness of an argument motivates the morphological deviation from the transitivity prototype that is typically encoded with NOM-ACC in Ancient Greek.

The foregroundedness of the underlying hypercategory (restrictive set/subkind/kind) and the backgroundedness of its instantiations indicate a development away from true partitivity towards pseudo-partitivity (‘a cup of tea’ as in КОПТЈЕВСКАЈА-ТАММ 2001) which provides information only about the respective kind and patterns thus semantically with the corresponding bare NPs, cf. the German translation:

- (42) German
eine Tasse Tee
 a cup tea
 ‘a cup of tea’

The Greek b-PG is thus somewhere in between the developmental cline in (6) of the partitives towards pseudo-partitives. An indirect evidence for the loss of the true-partitivity-semantics by the b-PG in Ancient Greek is that there arises a new partitive construction based on a new, periphrastic construction with an ablative-like PP *ek* + GEN or *apo* + GEN (cf. NACHMANSON 1942 for a number of examples). The b-PG aligns itself thereby with

the crosslinguistically attested cline by which partitive expressions start denoting instantiation-expressions while new partitive expressions on the bases of an ablative-like construction arise, cf. Russian (b-PG is replaced by the ablative PP *iz* + GEN), Latvian (the b-PG is replaced by the ablative PP *no* + GEN), Lithuanian (the b-PG is often replaced by the ablative PP *iš* + GEN), Finnish (partitive case replaced by the elative case, AHLO 1992) etc.

Abbreviations

ACC	accusative	PASS	passive
ACT	active	PERF	perfective
ADV	adverb	PG	partitive genitive
AOR	aorist	PL	plural
b-PG	the bare partitive genitive	PPr	Perseus Project. Collections of Greek and Roman texts at http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/
GEN	genitive		
INDEF	indefinite		
INF	infinitive	PRES	present
IMPV	imperative	PRON	pronoun
MID	middle	PRT	particle
NEG	negation	SG	singular
NEUT	neuter	SUBJ	subjunctive
NOM	nominative	SUPERL	superlative
OPT	optative	VOC	vocative
PARTC	participle		

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ILJA A. SERŽANT
 Sydnesplassen 7
 Box 7805
 5020 Bergen
 NORWAY
 ilja.serzant@uib.no