Legislative Veto Players, Cabinet Formation and Endogenous Institutions

PCQR Open Lecture

SPEAKER
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VENUE
University of Potsdam
Campus Griebnitzsee
House 6, Seminar Room S 22

ABOUT
Steffen Ganghof holds the chair for comparative politics at the University of Potsdam. Sebastian Eppner is senior researcher at the chair for comparative politics.

ABSTRACT
Are cabinets more likely to form when they control institutional veto players such as symmetric second chambers or minorities with veto rights? Existing research on this question has been inconclusive. Using newly assembled data on the party composition of veto institutions, the article applies conditional and mixed logit analyses to a much larger sample of government formations than existing studies (covering 21 parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies between 1955 and 2012). It shows that veto institutions had the expected effect only in those systems that abolished the relevant institutional veto player during the period under consideration. We argue that this result reflects the partial endogeneity of legislative veto institutions: the more these institutions actually constrain behavioral patterns in cabinet formation, the greater is the likelihood that they will be reformed or abolished. The results thus corroborate an equilibrium-perspective on democratic institutions: the effects of these institutions are systematically related to their stability.

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