

# Local Government Systems and Reforms in Europe

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### Structure

• Local Government Systems in Europe

• Local Government Reforms (I): NPM

• Local Government Reforms (II): Territorial Reforms


• Local Government Reforms (III): Decentralization

• Conclusion



# **Local Government Systems in Europe**

# The Importance of Local Self-Government



# **Local Government Systems** *Welcome to Variety*

Continental European Napoleonic Type (CEN)	Continental European Federal Type (CEF)	Nordic Type (NO)	Anglo Sax. Type (AS)	Central Eastern European Type (CEE)	South Eastern Europ. Type (SEE)
Belgium	Austria	Iceland	Cyprus	Czech Rep.	Albania
France	Germany	Nether.	Engl.	Hungary	Croatia
Greece	Switzerland	Norway	Ireland	Latvia	Romania
Italy		Sweden	Israel	Lithuania	Serbia
Portugal				Poland	Slovenia
Spain				Slovakia	
Turkey	Source: Heinelt/Hlepas/Kuhlmann et al. 2018				

### **Variety of Local Government Systems**

**Functional profile** 

Vertical division of tasks (central/local governments)

Separationist system: UK, S Fused system: D, F, I, H

Scope of tasks

High/multi purpose: UK, D, S, H G

Low/single purpose: F, I

Financial autonomy (own tax revenue)

High: S, F Medium: D, I Low: UK, H

**Territorial profile** 

Political profile

Size of Municipalities; voluntary principle vs. enforced amalgamation

Local leadership; council-

Northern European: UK, S Southern European: F, I, H

Hybrid: D

exectuive-powersharing

Strong mayor systems/dualistic: D, F, I, H Committee systems/monistic: UK, S

Citizen participation (local referenda)

Shaped by direct democracy: D, I, H Representative democr.: S, UK, F

Central-local interweaving; "upward" access

High: F, I, H Medium: D Low: UK, S

Universität Potsdam

Kuhlmann/Wollmann 2019 (forthc.)

# Position of Local Governments in the intergovernmental setting

	Local Government	State/Region	Central Government	Special Sector
Germany	38%	43%	Federal 12%	Social Insurance 7%
France	35%		44%	Public Health System 21%
U.K.	39%		55%	National Health Service 6%
Sweden	83%		17%	
Italy	13.6%	3.8%	54.7%	Public Health System 20.3%



# Local Fiscal Discretion (2011)

Country	Proportion of own taxes (without social contributions) in overall municipal revenue in % (2009)
Sweden	63.6
Switzerland	59.2
Slovak Republic	50.3
France	44.6
Spain	43.4
Norway	41.9
Czech Republic	41.2
Germany	39.6
Italy	37.4
Denmark	33.7
Portugal	33.6
Poland	30.9
Hungary	22.8
United Kingdom	12.9
Netherlands	8.3
Greece	6.6



Source: OECD 2011

Country	Ø Inhabitants per municipality	Ø km²	% municipalities < 5,000 PT	% municipalities > 100,000 PT
Czech Rep.	1,640	13	96	5
France	1,720	15	95	37
Hungary	3,170	29	91	9
Spain	5,430	62	85	58
Estonia	5,930	199	80	2
Germany	6,690	29	77	81
Italy	7,270	37	71	43
Greece	10,750	128	53	8
Finland	12,660	813	52	6
Poland	15,390	126	25	39
Bulgaria	29,090	420	11	11
Sweden	31,310	1,552	4	13
Denmark	55,480	440	3	6
Lithuania	56,570	1,088	2	5
UK	139,480	562	Not relevant	68
EU27	5,410	47	82*	500





## **Mayoral Strength Compared**



countries	index	countries	index	countries	index	countries	index
	value		value		value		value
Sweden	3	Denmark	6	Netherlands	7	Italy	10
Switzerland	4	Norway	6	Romania	7	Slovenia	10
Serbia	4	Albania	7	Cyprus	7.5	Iceland	11
Czech Republic	5	Austria <sup>coll.</sup>	7	England <sup>dir el.</sup>	8	Slovakia	11
England <sup>leadcab.</sup>	5	Belgium/Wall.	7	Hungary	8	Spain	11
England <sup>altern.</sup>	5	Croatia	7	Poland	8	France	12
Ireland	5	Germany <sup>coll.</sup>	7	Germany <sup>dir el.</sup>	9	Turkey	12
Portugal	5	Latvia	7	Austria <sup>dir. el.</sup>	9	Israel	13
Belgium/Fland.	6	Lithuania	7	Greece	10		

Mayoral strength index



Source: Heinelt/Hlepas/Kuhlmann/Swianiewicz 2018



### Local Government Systems: Germany, England, Sweden

Feature	Germany (CEF)	UK/England (AS)	Sweden (NOR)
State structure	federal; decentralized	unitary-centralized	unitary-decentralized
Local functional	broad functional profile;	broad functional profile;	broad functional profile;
responsibilities	general competence	(attenuated) ultra vires	general competence
	clause; fused	principle; separationist	clause; separationist
Local fiscal autonomy	Medium (39.6%)	Low (12.9%)	High (63.6%)
(% of own taxes/total			
local revenues, 2009)			
Local territorial	Hybrid	Northern European (201	Northern European (290
structures (No. of local	(11,146 municipalities; Ø	non-metropolitan	municipalities, Ø PT:
authorities/ Ø PT)	PT: 5,030)	districts; Ø PT: 102,000)	31,300)
Local Democracy	Strong mayor system;	Committee system; mainly	Committee system; mainly
	elements of direct	representative	representative
	democracy		
<b>Administrative Culture</b>	Rule of Law	Public Interest;	Rule of Law, culture of
		managerialism	transparency/ evaluation

	Dece	ntralization	Territorial	Evec /Mayor
Country	Func. Respons.*	Discret./Fin. self-reliance**	Structures***	Exec./Mayor
	>25%=strong	3 = strong	>10.000=strong	1=strong
	Continen	tal European Federal Type (ex	(amples)	
Germany	16,8	2	6 690	1
Switzerland	24,3	3	2 950	1
	Continenta	l European Napoleonic Type (	examples)	
France	20,9	3	1 720	1
Greece	5,6	2	33.600	1
Italy	31,3	3	7 270	1
		Nordic Type (examples)		
Denmark	64,3	2	55 480	0
Norway	33,3	3	11 020	0
Sweden	48,2	3	31 310	0
	ı	Anglo-Saxon Type (examples)		
Ireland	10,3	3	37 310	
UK	27,8	1	139 480	0
	Centra	Eastern European Type (exar	nples)	
Czech Rep.	27	1	1 640	0
Lithuania	25,6	1	56 570	1
Poland	33	2	15 390	1
	South	Eastern European Type (exam	iples)	
Bulgaria	18,1	2	29 090	1
Romania	23,9	1	6 800	1

# Increased Local Government Capacities in Europe

- More functional responsibilities; more autonomy
- More viable territorial structures (up-scaling)
- Better performing administrations; high (increased?) citizen satisfaction
- More opportunities for citizen participation and involvement






Evidence from the COST-Action LocRef



economic scholars & CzechActors Szolnok & Fonctional & Conference & Canalyze Lockef Research Utilization & Sweden & Fonctional & Conference & Leadership Toledo Morcatic amaldamation & institutional Cities & Integration Reform & Municipalities &

### **LG-Capacities: More Local Autonomy**










## Varying degrees of Autonomy





Source: Baldersheim et al. 2017; in: Kuhlmann/Schwab, O. (eds.)

### **LG-Capacities: More Territorial Viability**

Country	No. of municipalities Change 1973-2013 in%			
No	rthern Europe	Souther	n Europe	
Norway	-3.4	Slovenia	+44.2	
Finland	-33.7	Portugal	+1.3	
Sweden	-37.5	Spain	+0.8	
Denmark	-64.4	Italy	+0.4	
Iceland	-67.0	Greece	-94.6	
We	estern Europe	Eastern Europe		
Switzerland	-22.6			
Germany	-25.4			
The Netherlands	-55.3	Poland	+4.8	
Belgium	-75.0			
T	otal (mean)	-29	9.3	



## **Local Government Reforms**




### New Public Management: Convergence, Similarities, Isomorphism?

"The movement has been striking because of the number of nations that have taken up the <u>reform agenda</u> in such a short time and because of how <u>similar</u> their <u>basic strategies</u> have been" (Kettl 2000:1)

Talk/ Decisions vs. Practice/Action vs. Results/ Impacts

"Welcome to variety!" (Pollitt 2014)

# Nothing but NPM?





## Variety of Local Reform Approaches Similar discourses - Different paths

### (Post) NPM-Reforms

#### Other-than-NPM-Reforms

### External Re-Organization/ (Post-) NPM

Corporatization; Asset/Functional Privatization

One Stop Agencies; Costumer-Oriented Service Delivery

Re-Municipalization; Insourcing

### Internal Re-Organization/ (Post-) NPM

Internal Re-Organization, Relation Council -Administration

Performance Management, Output-Steering

HRM-Instruments; Performance Related Pay

### Territorial/ Functional Re-Scaling

Territorial Up-Scaling (amalgamation), municipal mergers, Regionalization

Trans-Scaling (inter-local cooperation)

Political/ administrative decentralization; deconcentration

### Democratic Renewal

Direct election/ Recall of local executives

Local referenda


Citizen forums, consultations, neighbourhood etc. councils



# **Example I: New Public Management**



### **New Public Management**





### NPM: an International Reform Policy?

- Different NPM-responsiveness
- Classical-Continental European Administrative Tradition:
  - Later/more cautious grasp of NPM-ideas
  - Maintenance of legalist orientation ("maintaining")
  - Combination of managerial and "Weberian" princibles (Neo-Weberianism)
  - Party withdrawal of NPM-instruments (e.g. re-municipalization; whole of government approaches; horizontal steering)
- Anglo-Saxon Managerial Administrative Tradition:
  - Radical NPM-reforms (marketization/"minimizing")
  - Cultural accessibility for managerial ideas
  - Comprehensive transfer of concepts and personnel from private sectore
  - "Revolution in Whitehall"; "War against local government" etc.

### **NPM** and Local Service Delivery

- Substantial NPM-driven changes in the organization of local service delivery; varying forms/patterns
- Pluralization of service providers; corporatization, outsourcing, asset privatization
- Local agencification: disaggregation of service provision into autonomous operative units
- Growing involvement of third sector actors in service provision



Result: from government to governance; from direct municipal service provision to multiple-actor networks with centrifugal dynamics, accountability problems, transaction costs

Wollmann 2016, in: Wollmann/Kopric/Marcou (eds.); Henriksen et al. 2016, in: Kuhlmann/Bouckaert (eds.)



### **NPM** and Local Service Delivery

### Is the pendulum swinging back?

- Differences between countries/sectors
- Public Utilities: lively trend of remunicipalisation in G (energy), modest in FIN, no trend in CH, S
- Waste management: moderate trend of re-municipal. in G, no trend in NO, NL
- Hospitals: clear trend of privatization in
   G, no full privatization in F
- Most European mayors don't want more outsourcing; yet insourcing is not a preferred option neither




# No return to status quo ante (before neoliberal age)

→ "The pendulum might have swung back, but the pendulum has halted far from its original position." (Bönker et al. 2016, S. 82).

Source: Grossi/Reichard; Klenk/Reiter; Bönker et al. 2016, in: Wollmann/Kopric/Marcou (eds.) Torsteinsen/Genugten 2016 in Kuhlmann/Bouckaert (eds.)







Source: Kuhlmann et al. 2018



# **Example II:**Territorial Reform Policies



### Territorial Reforms

### **Contrasting Cases:**

#### France:

"Mergers giving rise to enlarged jurisdictions are considered to be the ultimate threat – indeed, considered to be a way of committing political suicide" (Thoenig 2005: 691).





### **United Kingdom:**

".....in the UK is the almost obsessive predominance that is always given to production efficiency in any discussion of designing sub-national structures" (Sharpe 1993: 252)

"...Instead, the argument is about the best way to create even larger units in order to achieve greater efficiency of public services..." (John 2010: 101).



### **Territorial Reform Policies**

North-European Reform Type	South-European Reform Type
<ul> <li>UK, S, DK, German states (NRW, HE)</li> <li>"Up-Scaling"; Mergers</li> <li>UK: Ø 170,000 PT per district; Ø 720,000 PT per county</li> <li>Objective: performance improvements; efficiency, effectiveness, productivity</li> <li>Background: functionally strong LG-systems; rationalistic "Zeitgeist"/planning euphoria</li> <li>Enforcement of mergers through binding legislation</li> <li>Subordination of municipality under parliamentary decision-making authority</li> <li>New: Greece (reduction of municipalities by</li> </ul>	<ul> <li>F, I, many CEE countries; Ger. states (RhP, SH)</li> <li>Small-scale municipal structures preserved; further fragmentation</li> <li>F: 37,000 communes; Ø 1,700 PT</li> <li>Background: local tasks discharged by state administration (Napoleonic countries)</li> <li>Principle of Voluntariness: mergers only with consent of municipalities</li> <li>Massive local resistance to territorial reform</li> <li>F: 90% of municipalities in inter-municipal bodies = "pragmatic way to territorial reform" (Marcou)</li> <li>RhP: small (local) municipalities (2.258) untouched</li> </ul>






### **Territorial Rescaling**

"Small is beautiful"-theory (Lilliput)

- Lilliput-theory has lost in influence
- Significant changes in recent decades → no clear regional pattern (North/South) any more
- Greece: no. of LGs -80% (since 1997), Ø PT of municipalities from 1.600 to 34.000
- Yet, still countries with low average municip. populations (less than 5.000: ICE, A, CH, H, SK, F, CZ)



Source: Ladner 2017 in: Schwab/Bouckaert/Kuhlmann (eds.); Denters et al. 2014



### **Territorial Rescaling**

"Big is better"-theory (Brobdingnag)




- Growing average municipal populations
- Decreasing no. of municipalities
- Nordic countries with bigger municip.; rest of Europe variance
- Further up-scaling not only in the North:
  - East German counties; GR, BE
  - DK: from 272 to 98 municipalities
  - FIN: proposals  $339 \rightarrow 70$
  - NO: proposals 428 → 100
- 50% of OECD countries have planned/ completed mergers over last 15 years



Source: Ladner 2017 in: Schwab/Bouckaert/Kuhlmann (eds.); Denters et al. 2014



### **Example: Territorial Reforms**








### **Better Performance?**





Source: Denters et al. 2016: 336; in: Kuhlmann/Bouckaert (eds.)



### **Better Performance?**



- Functional responsibilities shape citizens perceptions: more functions → higher expectations → more critical views on LG performance
- Local performance (perceptions)
   influenced by additional factors (various reforms, starting conditions, type of LG)
- Some evidence on performance effects of amalgamation reforms:
  - Increased local capacities to resolve problems and deliver services
  - Increased service levels, scope of services, professionalization/ specialization, autonomy vis-à-vis upper levels (CH, ICE, NL etc.)



Outcome	Countries			
	No Importance	Medium Importance	High Importance	
	Improving Ir	nput		
Cost savings		FIN, I, S, CH	BE, G, GR, ICE	
	Improved Ou	itput		
Improved professional quality	I		BE, FIN, G, GR, ICE, S, CH	
Improved legal correctness	FIN, G, I, CH	ICE, S	BE, GR	
Improved citizen orientation	FIN, G, S	BE, GR, ICE, I, CH		
More equal treatment of citizens	S	FIN, G, GR, I, CH	BE, ICE	
	Room for Mane	uvering		
Strengthened local autonomy		BE, FIN, G, ICE	GR, I, NL, S, CH	
Increased influence of the superordinate tier of government	ICE, I, S, CH	BE, FIN, G, GR, NL		
Strengthened local mayors		FIN, ICE, I, CH	BE, G, GR, NL, S	
Strengthened local citizenship	FIN, G, ICE, NL, S	GR, I, CH	BE	
	Source: Steiner et al. 2016: 37; in: Kuhlmann/Bouckaert (eds.)			



# **Example III: Decentralization**



### **Decentralization Policies**

#### Political Decentralization:

Transfer of state tasks including political decision-making competencies for the local council (French case)

#### Administrative Decentralization:

Transfer of state tasks without political decision-making competencies for the local council (German case)

#### • De-Concentration:

Creation of locally operating single purpose state agencies substituting local governments (British case)



## Decentralization Policies

Decentralization Policy	Germany	France	UK/England
Institutional Changes in the Intergovernmen- tal Setting	Withdrawal of de- concentrated state administration; dissolution of state authorities	Weakening of de- concentrated state administration; however, institutional persistence	Inflation of de- concentrated state administration; agencies/quangos
Territoriality/ Functionality	Strengthening of territorial organization; multi-purpose, but financial crisis	Strengthening of the territorial organization; multi-purpose, but units are too small	Weakening of the territorial organization; single-purpose
Local Democracy/ Political Accountability	Formal non-political (administrative) decentralization, but in fact politicization of transferred tasks	Political decentralization, in fact strengthening of local executives (mayors)	Administrative deconcentration; weakening of local councils



# Does it make a difference? Evaluating Reform Effects

Dimensions of Performance	Performance indicators
Democratic control	<ul> <li>Formal decision-making competencies of local council</li> <li>Actual increase in political discretion</li> <li>Participation of interests groups/ citizens in decision-making</li> </ul>
Horizontal and vertical coordination	<ul> <li>Conflict intensity of interactions between sectors/across levels</li> <li>Capacity of problem solving</li> <li>Creation of coordination units/institutions</li> </ul>
Efficiency	<ul> <li>Achieved savings (costs, personal)</li> <li>Changes in output (number of cases)</li> <li>Ratio input-output</li> </ul>
Effectiveness	<ul> <li>Legal quality, formal correctness of service delivery</li> <li>Professional quality of service delivery</li> <li>Proximity to citizens/ Customer orientation</li> </ul>
Equity	• Equal treatment of citizens in different communes

	Polititical Decentralization				lization
Performance	France		Germany	England	Germany
Dimension	Technical	Commu-	Commu-	Technical	Technical
	Planning	nity-	nity-	Planning	Planning
	Task	Related	Related	Task	Task
		Task	Task		
Effectiveness	+	0	+	+	_
Efficiency	1	-	1	-	+
Horizontal				1	. /
Coordination	+	+	+	+	+/-
Vertical				0	
Coordination	-	-	-	0	-
Democratic	0	0			
Control	U	U	ı	+	_
Equity	-	-	-	_	_

Polititical Decentralization

-

40

Administrative

Deconcentration

England

Community

-Related

Task

+/-

Technical

Planning

Task

+/-

+

Admin.



## **Conclusion**



### Results: Convergence/Divergence/Persistence

- Convergence between countries/country groups:
  - Discourses (NPM) and instruments (performance measurement)
  - Reform Trajectories (Northern territorial model, decentralisation)
  - → Perceivable only if level of abstraction is high
  - → Sociological Institutionalism/ New Institutional economy
- **Divergence** between countries/country groups:
  - Implementation/modes of steering (top-down/bottom up; minimizing/marketization/Re-Weberianisation)
  - Effects (multi purpose vs. single purpose model; gains vs. losses in democratic participation)
  - → Better perceivable if analytical focus is "sharp"; level of abstraction lower
  - → Historical and Actor-Centred Institutionalism
- **Persistence**: Typological differences between adm. cultures/-traditions



# Future Challenges and Possible Riscs Dystopian Scenarios

- Functional overburdening of the local level;
- Too many complex (supra-local) tasks
- Lacking resources, pol. decision-making rights
- Too many institutions/levels, institutional thickness, over-institutionalization of the territories; decreasing effectiveness
- "Bigger and bigger" → institutional failures?
- From local government to governance → institutional fragmentation; transaction costs, lack of accountability
- Too much powers to the local executives; problems with checks and balances; corruption?





# Future Challenges Utopian Scenarios

- Local governments fit for resolving wicked problems/meeting future challenges
- Powerful, well-performing and innovating local governments with high degrees of discretion (e.g. CEN, CEE, SEE)
- Eliminate the urban-rural divide
- Engage citizens in local politics; activate local citizenship
- Enhance people's trust in (local) politics and increase the legitimacy of public institutions at all levels of government







# Thank you for your attention!



Schwab | Bouckaert | Kuhlmann [eds.]

# The Future of Local Government in Europe

Lessons from Research and Practice in 31 Countries



Nomos



Sabine Kuhlmann and Geert Bouckaert, Palgrave, 2016

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Christian Schwab, Geert Bouckaert and Sabine Kuhlmann, Nomos, 2017







