


# Cannabis Use and Support for Cannabis Legalization

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
## 1.1. Introduction: Cannabis policies in the world



## 1.2. Introduction: Opinions on cannabis policies


### Individual data

Support on cannabis policies based on self use of cannabis; youngsters between 15-25 in 27 EU countries



### Cross-country data

Support on cannabis policies and % of those who used cannabis in the last year; youngsters between 15-25 in 27 EU countries



Source: European Commission 2011

## 2. Motivation- Self interest and inside information

Cannabis users are more in favor of legalization/regulation rather than prohibition. We relate this to 2 reasons:

- Self interest: Cost minimization behavior. Prohibition means more cost for users.
- Inside information: Learning behavior. Cannabis users know more about the potential dangers of cannabis. Assessment of dangers.

Current users of cannabis will be affected by both self interest and inside information, whereas past users will be affected by only inside information as such there will be no cost increase for them in case of a prohibition.

## 3. Cannabis policy in the Netherlands



(A coffeeshop in Amsterdam.)

- Cannabis-use is quasi-legalized. Small quantities of cannabis can be bought at *coffeeshops*.
- Main concern of Dutch policies: *Tolerance* and *Public health*.
- Since 1976: A distinction between soft and hard drugs. Only soft drugs are tolerated.
- In 1999: 846 coffeeshops. In 2011: 651.
- A recent licensing attempt *failed*.

## 4. Data

The LISS Panel provides detailed information about cannabis use dynamics and opinions on cannabis policies:

- At what age, approximately, did you **first** use cannabis? (30% is ever user.)
- Have you used cannabis in the **last 30 days**. (17% of ever users says yes.)
- Please indicate if you agree or disagree to the following statement in a **scale of 1-5**.
  - "Cannabis should not be prohibited" & "Coffeeshops should be permitted."



## 5. Econometric Methodology

- Cannabis use dynamics:** Age of onset of cannabis use and quitting rates are modeled within a mixed proportional hazard setting with unobserved heterogeneity.
- Opinions on cannabis policies:** Opinions on cannabis policy statements are analyzed with an ordered probit model. Unconditional probability of reporting a level of agreement in a scale of 1-5 is specified as

$$\Pr(y = j | x_3) = \int_{\epsilon} \text{Prob}(y = j | x_3, \epsilon) dG(\epsilon) \quad (1)$$

where  $j \in \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5\}$ , denoting ordered responses.  $G(\epsilon)$  is a discrete mixing distribution capturing unobserved heterogeneity in the opinions.

- Joint model:** Opinions on cannabis policies and cannabis use dynamics might be simultaneously determined by a set of unobserved factors. To control for correlation between such unobserved characteristics and establish a causal effect, we jointly estimate the ordered probit model and the mixed proportional hazard models.



$$g_2(t_c, t_q, y = j | x_1, x_2, x_3) =$$

$$\int_{\epsilon} \int_{v} \int_{w} f_c(t_c | x_1, v) f_q(t_q | x_2, w) \text{Prob}(y = j | x_3, \epsilon) dG(v, w, \epsilon) \quad (2)$$

where  $G(v, w, \epsilon)$  is a discrete mixing distribution capturing correlation between unobserved heterogeneity affecting cannabis use dynamics and the opinions.  $t_c$  and  $t_q$  are durations of the first use and total duration of use, respectively.

## 6. Cannabis use: A simple overview of the dynamics

- Starting rates of cannabis use
- Cumulative probability of cannabis use



## 7. Opinions: Results of the joint model & Falsification Analysis

	Univariate model		Joint model	
	Past use	Current use	Past use	Current use
<b>Legalization &amp; prohibition</b>				
1. Cannabis not prohibited	1.04 (12.9)**	1.70 (10.1)**	0.69 (5.2)**	1.34 (7.8)**
2. Coffeeshops permitted	0.86 (11.9)**	1.45 (9.9)**	0.46 (3.7)**	1.05 (7.0)**
<b>Placebo 1. Alcohol legislation</b>				
3. No sale under 16	-0.13 (2.0)**	-0.37 (2.4)**	0.16 (1.1)	-0.09 (0.1)
4. No sale at meetings 16	-0.04 (7.8)**	-0.50 (3.1)**	-0.19 (1.5)	-0.21 (1.2)
<b>Placebo 2. Non-substance use policies</b>				
5. Citizens' influences	0.19 (1.9)*	0.21 (0.7)	-0.18 (1.0)	0.19 (0.7)
6. Student loans	-0.04 (0.1)	0.03 (0.1)	-0.01 (0.3)	0.01 (0.1)

Absolute t-statistics in parentheses. \* and \*\* are for statistical significance at 10% and 5%, respectively. Sample size is 2016.

- Univariate model: High correlation. Joint model: A large part of this correlation is due to non-causal mechanisms.
- Evidence for causal effect of current and past use of cannabis.
- The effect of cannabis use on opinions about alcohol disappears in the joint model.
- It is not the case that cannabis users and non-users are different anyway regardless of the nature of the policy.**

## 8. Conclusions

Both current use and past use increases the chances of supporting more liberal cannabis policies.

- The effect of inside information suggests that cannabis use may not be as harmful as cannabis users originally thought it was and not as harmful as non-users are inclined to think it is.