

TITLE: RESEARCH QUESTION

Do Employers Discriminate Less If Vacancies Are Difficult to Fill? Evidence from a field experiment

RESEARCH QUESTION: IN OTHER WORDS

Do employers discriminate less if they have to attract workers for occupations for which labour market tension is high?

FORMER CONTRIBUTIONS: DIRECT AND INDIRECT THEORETICAL EVIDENCE

Ashenfelter (1970), Black (1985) and Biddle and Hamermesh (2012):

"Employers with monopsony power have an opportunity to select workers according to their preferences"

"Higher arrival rates of employees at vacancies lower cost of discrimination: less foregone output when a minority worker is turned away"

OUR CONTRIBUTION: DIRECT THEORETICAL EVIDENCE

Research methodology


Correspondence methodology

- Pairs of fictitious job applications are sent to real job openings.
- Both applications differ only by the minority status of the candidate.
- By monitoring the subsequent call back, discrimination is identified.
- "Golden standard" to identify discrimination in the labour market
- Employer discrimination is disentangled from supply side determinants of LM outcomes.
- Selection on unobservable characteristics is not an issue.
- Bertrand and Mullainathan (ADR, 2004) is seminal work.

Research design (1)



Research design (2)



Research design (3)

How is "difficult to fill" (high labour market tension) measured?

- Each vacancy can be matched with a profession following the ADR classification.
- For each profession we know the labour market tension.
- Median duration time (in 2011) of job openings for this profession
- Bottleneck status (in 2011) of this profession



Descriptive results

	Call back Turkish	Call back Turkish	Call back ratio	Swable
All vacancies	0.19	0.13	1.44**	2.04
Vacancies for bottleneck professions	0.17	0.17	1.03	0.07
Vacancies for non-bottleneck professions	0.21	0.10	2.05***	2.04

Main regression results

Probit estimates, marginal effects: invitation for job interview		Probit estimates, marginal effects: invitation for job interview	
Turkish*orig	-0.06** (0.02)	Turkish*Bottleneck profession	-0.01 (0.02)
Pseudo R-squared	0.01	Turkish*Non-bottleneck profession	-0.11** (0.02)
Observations	752	Bottleneck profession	-0.03 (0.02)
		Pseudo R-squared	0.02
		Observations	752

Do employers discriminate against foreign school leavers? Yes

Do employers discriminate less if vacancies are difficult to fill? Yes

Sensitivity analyses (1)

Conducted sensitivity analyses

- Alternative outcome variable
- Any positive reaction
- Alternative tension variable
- Median vacancy duration time for profession
- Additional interactions with origin
- Education level, customer contact, fraction foreign workers in sector
- Alternative model
- Linear probability model
- Heteroskedastic probit model

Probit estimates, marginal effects: any positive reaction	
Turkish*Bottleneck profession	-0.01 (0.03)
Turkish*Non-bottleneck profession	-0.15** (0.02)

Sensitivity analyses (2)

Probit estimates, marginal effects: invitation for job interview		Probit estimates, marginal effects: invitation for job interview	
Turkish	-0.06** (0.02)	Turkish*Bottleneck profession	-0.09* (0.03)
Turkish*Median vacancy duration time for profession	0.04** (0.01)	Turkish*Non-bottleneck profession	-0.17** (0.04)
		Turkish*High educated	0.11** (0.03)
		Turkish*Customer contact	-0.02 (0.02)
		Turkish*% foreign workers in sector	0.02 (0.02)

Sensitivity analyses (3)

Heteroskedastic probit model

- Critique (Heckman and Sigelman, 1993): differences in variance of unobs. characteristics can generate spurious evidence of discrimination.
- Solution: heteroskedastic probit
- allows variance of error term to vary with ethnicity

Heteroskedastic probit, marginal effects: invitation for job interview	
Turkish*Bottleneck profession	-0.01 (0.02)
Turkish*Non-bottleneck profession	-0.11** (0.02)