

LECTURE: COOPERATION IN A COMPANY: A LARGE-SCALE EXPERIMENT

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We analyze cooperation within a company setting in order to study external validity and consequences of a cooperative attitude. Around 450 employees of a large software firm participate in a fully incentivized online experiment. We observe very high levels of cooperation in a modified public goods game and the typical conditional cooperation patterns. When linking cooperation levels with individual decisions and outcomes within the company, cooperation in our experiment is predictive, for instance, for the receipt of non-monetary appreciation awards distributed among work team members. However, salary increases and monetary awards are preferably allocated to less cooperative employees. This relationship is mainly relevant for the sales and consulting division of the company. For the remaining employees there exists no statistically relevant relationship. More cooperative individuals also report a higher level of perceived stress. We analyze mechanisms that potentially explain these results. (with Martin Kocher and Christiane Schwieren)